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Unresolved Issues Regarding Passthrough Entities,
Community Property, and Federal Tax Law Create
Headaches for Spouses in Louisiana
Susan Kalinka*
Disregarded entities, partnerships, S corporations, and LLCs
that are taxed as disregarded entities, partnerships, or S
corporations are sometimes referred to as passthrough entities. The
term "passthrough entity" describes the federal and state tax
treatment of the entity's income and transactions between the
owner and the entity. A disregarded entity is an entity owned by
one person whose separate existence from its owner is disregarded
for tax purposes.' Thus, the income of a disregarded entity "passes
through" to the owner of the entity, and the owner is liable for the
tax on the disregarded entity's income. Because a disregarded
entity is disregarded as a separate entity from its owner,
transactions between the disregarded entity and its owner are not
taken into account and have no tax consequences. Thus,
distributions from a disregarded entity to its owner are not subject
to income tax. In general, a disregarded entity is an unincorporated
entity, like an LLC, organized under federal law or the laws of one
of the states and is classified as a disregarded entity for federal tax
purposes, if the
entity has not made an election to be classified as a
3
corporation.
Under federal tax law, the income of a partnership or S
corporation, like the income of a disregarded entity, "passes
through" the entity and is taxed to the partners or shareholders. The
partners and shareholder must report their shares of the entity's
income in the year the income is earned, regardless of whether that
income is distributed to them.4 Later, when the previously taxed
Copyright 2009, by SUSAN KALnKA.
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1. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(a)(4), 301.7701-2(a), 301.7701-3(a) (2008).
2. See id. § 301.7701-2(a) (activities of a disregarded entity are treated as
the activities of a sole proprietor, branch, or division of the owner for federal tax
purposes).
*

3. Id. § 301.7701-3(a),(b)(1).

4. I.R.C. § 701 (2002 & Supp. 2008) (partnership does not pay tax on its
income); id. § 702 (each partner is taxed on the partner's distributive share of
partnership income); id. § 1363(a) (S corporation generally does not pay tax on
its income); id. § 1366(a) (S corporation shareholder is taxed on the
shareholder's pro rata share of the S corporation's income).
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income of the passthrough entity is distributed to the owner(s), the
distribution is tax free to the distributee. 5 For convenience, this
Article often will focus on the treatment of the income of
disregarded entities, partnerships, and S corporations under both
federal income tax and community property law, with the reader's
understanding that the treatment of an LLC's income is likely to be
the same if the LLC is taxed as a disregarded entity, partnership, or
S corporation. This Article will also sometimes refer collectively to
disregarded entities, partnerships, S corporations, and LLCs taxed
as such entities as "passthrough entities."
To the extent that a disregarded entity, partnership, or S
corporation generally does not pay tax on its own income, the
entity is treated as an aggregate of its owners. Louisiana business
organization law, however, treats LLCs, partnerships, C
corporations, and S corporations as entities separate from their
owners. 6 It is uncertain whether Louisiana community property
law treats a passthrough entity as an entity separate from its
owners. The courts all agree that distributions of income earned by
a passthrough entity during the existence of the community are
community property, even if the interest is the separate property of
one of the spouses, unless that spouse has reserved distributions as
separate property in accordance with the procedures prescribed by
Louisiana community property law.7
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has held that the
undistributed income of a partnership or S corporation is separate
property if the partnership interest or stock in the S corporation is
the separate property of a spouse.8 Similarly, Louisiana courts have
held that, as a general rule, the undistributed income of a
5. I.R.C. § 705(a) (2002) (adjusted basis of partner's interest in the
partnership increased to reflect the partner's distributive share of the
partnership's net income, reduced by distributions); id. § 731(a) (distributions
from a partnership tax free to a partner to the extent of the partner's adjusted
basis in the partner's interest in the partnership); id. § 1367(a) (2002 & Supp.
2008) (basis of S corporation shareholder's stock increased to reflect the
shareholder's pro rata share of the S corporation's net income, reduced by
distributions from the corporation to the shareholder); id. § 1368 (distributions
from an S corporation to a shareholder are generally tax free to the extent of the
shareholder's adjusted basis in his or her stock).
6. LA. CIV. CODE art 2801 (2009) (partnerships); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:41 (1994 & Supp. 2009) (corporations); id. § 12:1329 (LLCs).
7. Denegre v. Denegre, 30 La. Ann. 275 (La. 1878). See also LA. CIv.
CODE art. 2339 (2009) (fruits of separate property are treated as community
property unless the spouse who owns the property has reserved its fruits as
separate property in writing).
8. McKneely v. McKneely, 764 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000) (S
corporation); Ogden v. Ogden, 331 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
337 So. 2d 523 (La. 1976) (partnership).
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partnership is not community property if the interest is the separate
property of one of the spouses. 9 Nevertheless, the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal has held that a spouse's share of a
partnership's undistributed income is community property even
though the spouse owns the partnership interest as separate
property, if and to the extent that the spouse may withdraw it at
any time and for any purpose.' 0 The third circuit's distinction
between undistributed income of a partnership in general and
partnership income that is available to a partner makes sense.
Nevertheless, the rule may result in inequity when the community
terminates.
On termination and partition of the community, each spouse is
entitled to receive one-half of the community property. If the
undistributed income of a partnership is treated as community
property even though a spouse owns the interest in the partnership
as separate property, the undistributed income is likely to be
treated as having been distributed and then reinvested in the
partnership. 12 In that case, the non-owning spouse may receive
reimbursement for one-half of the income that is treated as
reinvested in the partnership. On termination of the community, a
spouse is entitled to reimbursement of the amount or value of onehalf of the amount or value of community property used for the
acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of the separate property
of the other spouse. 13 Thus, the spouse who does not own an
interest in a partnership would be entitled to the same income
twice: first when it is treated as distributed and therefore,
community property, and second when the same income is treated
as reinvested in the partnership. As of this writing, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has not decided whether the undistributed income
of a passthrough entity is community or separate property. Thus, it
is uncertain how the undistributed income of a passthrough entity
that is owned as separate property is classified under Louisiana
community property law.

9. See, e.g., Ogden, 331 So. 2d 592; Dubuisson v. Moseley, 232 So. 2d
870 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
10. Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 414
So. 2d 375 (La. 1982); Guilott v. Guilott, 361 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 361 So. 2d 1271 (La. 1978).
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 807 (the right of a co-owner to partition property);
id art. 2341.1 (each spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in community
property); id. art. 2369.1 (on termination of the community, provisions
governing co-ownership generally apply to former community property).
12. See, e.g., Downs, 410 So. 2d 793.
13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2366.
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Regardless of whether the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity is treated as community or separate property,
the spouse who does not own an interest in the entity will be liable
for the tax on that income if the couple files a joint income tax
return. As explained above, the owner of an interest in a
passthrough entity is liable for the tax on the owner's share of the
entity's undistributed income. If the spouses file a joint federal or
state income tax return, the income attributable to a spouse's share
of a passthrough entity's undistributed income must be reported on
the return. Each spouse's liability for the tax required to be
reported on a joint income tax return is joint and several, in the
case of a federal joint tax return, or joint and in solido in the case
of a state joint income tax return.14 Because each spouse is liable
for the entire amount of the tax due on the couple's aggregate
income for the year in which the return is filed, the tax liability on
the undistributed income of a passthrough entity is a community
obligation. 15 If community property is used to pay the tax on the
entity's undistributed income, the spouse who does not own an
interest in the entity should not be entitled to reimbursement of any
of the community property used to pay the tax. Thus, on partition
of the community, the non-owning spouse should not receive any
portion of the undistributed income or the amount of community
property used to satisfy the tax liability on that income if the
couple filed a joint return for the year in which the entity earned
the income.16
Nevertheless, on partition of the community, a spouse is
entitled to receive one-half of the amount by which a separately
owned interest in a partnership, S corporation, or LLC increased in
value to the extent that the increase in the value of the interest is
attributable to the uncompensated or undercompensated labor of
14. I.R.C. § 6013(d) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (joint and several liability in the
STAT. ANN. § 47:101 (B)(1)
(2001) (joint and in solido liability in the case of a joint state income tax return).
15. Louisiana Civil Code article 2360 provides that an obligation incurred
by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the
common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a
community obligation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360. Because the spouse who does
not own an interest in a passthrough entity that constitutes the separate property
of the other spouse is liable for the tax on the entity's undistributed income, the
tax liability is a community obligation. The payment of the tax is in the interest
of the non-owning spouse.
16. But see McKneely v. McKneely, 764 So. 2d 1157, 1160 n.1 (La. App.
1st Cir. 2000) (observing, in dicta, that the trial court properly calculated a
reimbursement to the non-owning spouse for her share of community funds used
to pay taxes on an S corporation's undistributed income where the S corporation
stock was the other spouse's separate property).

case of a joint federal income tax return); LA. REv.
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either or both of the spouses. 17 It may be difficult, however, for the
non-owning spouse to prove that the increase in value of an
interest in an entity that constitutes the separate property of the
other spouse is attributable to the uncompensated or
undercompensated labor of one or both spouses, especially if the
spouse or spouses have been compensated for services provided to
the entity. If the assets of the entity consist of income-producing
property, the increase in value of a spouse's interest in that entity is
likely to be attributable to the increase in value of the underlying
assets, and not attributable to any effort or labor of either spouse.
Inequities may result if any of a spouse's share of the
undistributed income of a passthrough entity is omitted from the
joint return and the interest in the entity is the separate property of
that spouse. In such a case, the IRS may seize the non-owning
spouse's share of community property or the non-owning spouse's
separate property in satisfaction of the tax deficiency, interest,
and/or penalties attributable to the unreported or under-reported
income unless the non-owning spouse qualifies as an "innocent
spouse" under section 6015 of the Internal Revenue Code or
section 47: 101 (B)(7) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. However,
it is not always easy for a spouse to qualify for innocent spouse
status.
If the spouses file separate income tax returns, it is not certain
whether a spouse is liable for the tax on one-half of a passthrough
entity's undistributed income allocated to the other spouse whose
interest in the entity is separate property. A spouse who resides in a
community property state and files a separate income tax return is
personally liable for the tax on one-half of the community
income.' Regardless of whether the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity is separate income under Louisiana
jurisprudence, it is not certain that federal courts will accept the
treatment of that income as separate property for federal income
tax purposes. If a spouse domiciled in Louisiana who files a
separate income tax return is liable for tax on one-half of the
undistributed income of a passthrough entity allocated to the other
spouse, whose interest in the entity is separate property, then the
non-owning spouse may qualify for relief from liability for that
income if he or she meets the innocent spouse requirements of
section 66 of the Internal Revenue Code. Like innocent spouse
status under section 6015, innocent spouse status under section 66
is not always easy to attain. This Article discusses some of the
17. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2368.
18. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). See also Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S.
127 (1930) (applying the principles of Poe to spouses domiciled in Louisiana).
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problems that may arise for spouses in Louisiana where one of the
spouses owns an interest in a passthrough entity as separate
property and argues that such income should be treated as the
separate property of the spouse who owns the interest in the entity
both for purposes of community property law and for purposes of
income tax law.
A discussion of the innocent spouse rules under sections 66 and
6015 of the Internal Revenue Code is beyond the scope of this
Article. Other commentators have discussed the rules in detail.' 9
I. CLASSIFICATION OF INTERESTS IN AND INCOME OF A
DISREGARDED ENTITY, PARTNERSHIP, S CORPORATION, OR LLC AS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY OR SEPARATE PROPERTY AND THE
FEDERAL TAx TREATMENT OF SUCH INCOME

An interest in a disregarded entity, partnership, S corporation,
or LLC is separate property if it was acquired by a spouse before
the marriage, before the establishment of a community property
regime, or as a result of a partition of community property.20 If an
interest in a disregarded entity, partnership, S corporation, or LLC
is acquired by one of the spouses during the existence of the
community property regime by gift or inheritance, that interest also
is considered separate property. 21 An interest in a disregarded
entity, partnership, S corporation, or LLC also may be a spouse's
separate property if the spouse acquires the interest with separate
property or with separate and community property and the value of
community property is inconsequential in comparison 22with the
value of the separate prop3erty used to acquire the interest.
In Moise v. Moise, 3 the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal held that an interest in an LLC was the husband's separate
property even though the wife had provided valuable services on
behalf of the LLC during the existence of the community. In 1993,
Mr. Moise purchased real estate in Tangipahoa Parish for $24,000.
Mr. and Mrs. Moise were married in 1995. On December 31, 2002,
the Moise Family, L.L.C., was formed. In partial consideration of
his 100% interest in the LLC, Mr. Moise transferred a partial
interest in the Tangipahoa property. In 2003, the LLC entered into
a lease agreement with Verizon Wireless for the parcel of the
19. See, e.g., 3, 4A BORIS I. BrITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTs §§ 76.4, 111.3.2 (3d ed. 2003).
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 956 So. 2d 9 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2007).
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Tangipahoa property that Mr. Moise had transferred to the LLC.
The lease agreement required Verizon to pay the LLC $12,000 per
year.
Mrs. Moise argued that the LLC was community property and
also that she owned a 50% interest in the LLC. To support her
claim, Mrs. Moise produced the LLC's initial report naming her as
one of "the first managers, or the members," the LLC's 2003 tax
return listing Mr. and Mrs. Moise as 50% partners for purposes of
profit sharing, and the Verizon lease identifying her as a member
of the LLC. Mrs. Moise also testified that she contributed services
to the LLC, including cutting grass on the Tangipahoa property,
payment of the LLC's fees (including one-half of the fees paid to
the LLC's accountant), meeting with Verizon's representatives in
pursuant of the lease agreement, and opening the LLC's bank
account.
The court held that Mrs. Moise was not a member of the LLC.
The court determined that none of the documents Mrs. Moise
presented supported her argument. The initial report was
ambiguous as to Mrs. Moise's status. It listed her as either a
manager or a member. A manager of a Louisiana LLC does not
have to be a member.24 The fifth circuit agreed with the trial court
that the duties Mrs. Moise performed for the LLC were those of a
manager. The court also concluded that the designation of Mrs.
Moise as a member under the lease agreement did not change her
status in fact.
Finally, the court concluded that the 2003 tax return was not
relevant because Mrs. Moise was liable for the tax on one-half of
the rents paid under the terms of the Verizon lease agreement. The
United States Supreme Court has held that a spouse who resides in
a community property state is personally liable for the tax on onehalf of the community income.25 Under Louisiana community
property law, income from separate property is community
property unless the spouse who owns the property makes 26
a
designation by authentic act that the income is separate property.
Thus, Mrs. Moise was the owner of one-half of the rents derived
24. Subparts (12) and (13) of Louisiana Revised Statutes section
12:1301(A) provide different definitions of the terms "manager" and "member."
Thus, managers are not the same as members. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:1301 (1994 & Supp. 2009). Under Louisiana Revised Statutes section
12:1301(A)(12), the term "manager" is defined as a person or persons
designated by the LLC members to manage the LLC as provided in the articles
of organization. Id.
25. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 190
(1930).
26.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339.
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from the lease, regardless of whether she was designated as a
member of the LLC on the couple's federal income tax return.
In finding that the LLC was Mr. Moise's separate property, the
trial court and the fifth circuit relied on the fact that Mr. Moise had
transferred separate property to the LLC in exchange for a 100%
interest in the LLC. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that
separate property includes property acquired by a spouse "with
separate things or with separate and community things when the
value of community things is inconsequential in comparison with
the value of separate things used.",27 Under Moise, an LLC interest
is separate property if it is acquired with separate property.
Mrs. Moise had paid some of the fees incurred by the LLC.
The Moise court did not indicate whether the fees were paid with
community property or Mrs. Moise's separate property. If the fees
were paid with community property, then Mrs. Moise would have
been entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the fees upon
termination of the community. The fees owed by the LLC were the
separate obligations of Mr. Moise because they were not incurred
for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of Mrs.
Moise.28 If community property is used to satisfy the separate
obligation of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to
reimbursement upon termination of the community of one-half of
the amount or the value of the community property at the time it
was used.29
Similarly, a spouse is entitled to reimbursement of one-half of
any community property that was used to benefit the separate
property of the other spouse. 30 The payment of the fees in Moise
either satisfied Mr. Moise's separate obligation to pay the fees (if
he was personally liable for the payment) or else benefitted Mr.
Moise's separate property (if the LLC was liable for the payment).
Thus, Mrs. Moise would be entitled to reimbursement of one-half
of the fees if she paid the fees with community property. On the
other hand, if Mrs. Moise had paid the fees with her separate
property, she should have been entitled to reimbursement of the
entire amount she had paid.
It appears that the rents under the Verizon lease were paid
directly to Mr. and Mrs. Moise. If the LLC had collected the rental
income and not distributed it, it is not certain whether the court
27. Id.art. 2341.
28. See id.art. 2363 (defining the term "separate obligation" as an
obligation incurred by a spouse prior to the establishment of the community or
one incurred during the existence of the community but not for the common
interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse).

29. Id.art. 2364.
30. Id. art. 2365.
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would have held 3that
the undistributed income of the LLC was
1
separate property.
The LLC in Moise filed tax returns as a partnership for federal
tax purposes. If, in fact, the LLC had only one owner, it should
have been treated as a disregarded entity under the United States
Treasury Department's entity classification regulations. 32 A
disregarded entity is an unincorporated entity with only one owner
that is not classified as a corporation for federal tax purposes. An
LLC that is not classified as a corporation for federal tax purposes
is classified as a partnership if it has more than one member, but as
a disregarded entity if it has only one member. 33 The activities of a
disregarded entity are treated as the activities of a sole
proprietorship if the owner of the interest in the entity is an
individual, or as a branch or division if the owner of the interest in
the entity is a corporation or other entity. 34 Thus, the income of a
disregarded entity is treated as the income of its owner.
Accordingly, Mr. Moise would have been subject to tax on the
LLC's rental income regardless of whether he actually received the
rental payments made on the Verizon lease.
As of this writing, no case could be found in which a Louisiana
court has ruled on the issue of whether the undistributed income of
an LLC that is classified as a partnership or disregarded entity is
community property when the interest in the LLC is the separate
property of one of the spouses. Nevertheless, Louisiana courts of
appeal have considered the issue of whether the undistributed
income of a partnership or an S corporation is community property
in cases where the partnership interest or S corporation stock is
separate property and the owner of the interest in the entity did not

31.

See, e.g., McKneely v. McKneely, 764 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 1st Cir.

2000) (undistributed income of an S corporation constituted the separate
property of the spouse whose interest in the S corporation was separate
property); Ogden v. Ogden, 331 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 337

So. 2d 523 (La. 1976) (undistributed income of a partnership did not constitute
community income until it was used to purchase property titled in the name of
the partner). But cf Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 414 So. 2d 375 (La. 1982) (undistributed income of a partnership

constitutes community income if the partner has control over whether and when
the income will be distributed to him or her); Guilott v. Guilott, 361 So. 2d 1271

(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 363 So. 2d 68 (La. 1978) (partnership income

deposited in partner's drawing account constituted community income even
though the amount in the drawing account was not distributed to the partner
whose interest in the partnership was her separate property).
32. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-301.7701-3 (2008).
33. Id. § 301.7701-3(a).
34. Id. § 301.7701-2(a).
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35
reserve the fruits of the partnership interest as separate property.
The courts seem to be split on the issue of whether the
undistributed income of a partnership or S corporation that
constitutes the separate property of a spouse should be treated as
community property or separate property. The partnership cases
are discussed first, followed by the S corporation case.

A. UndistributedIncome of a Partnership
The partnership cases seem to distinguish between a partner's
ability to access income transferred to the partner's drawing
account and a partner's lack of control over the timing and amount
of partnership distributions. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal has held that the undistributed income of partnership
income is community property, if and to the extent that the partner
may draw upon it at any time. 36 If a partner does not have control
over distributions, then the undistributed income is not community
property. 37 On the other hand, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal has indicated that partnership income included in the
partner's capital account is separate property of the3 partner-spouse
until the income has been distributed to the partner. F
In Guilott v. Guilott,39 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of

Appeal held that certain stock purchased by a partnership in
commendam for an in commendam partner constituted a
distribution of the stock to the partner and was therefore
community property. In Guilott, Mrs. Guilott had received an in
commendam, or limited, partnership interest as a gift from her
father. Thus, the partnership interest was separate property.4" Each
partner had a capital account and a drawing account. The capital
account was referred to as a "net worth account" and was owned
by each partner in proportion to the partner's respective interest in
the partnership. Each year, the partnership placed each partner's
share of partnership earnings in that partner's drawing account. A
partner could require the partnership to distribute the earnings
35. See, e.g., McKneely, 764 So. 2d at 1162-63; Downs, 410 So. 2d 793;
Guilott, 361 So. 2d 1271; Ogden, 331 So. 2d 592.
36. See, e.g., Downs, 410 So. 2d 793; Guilott, 361 So. 2d 1271; Ogden, 331
So. 2d 592.
37. See, e.g., Dubuisson v. Moseley, 232 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970).
38. See, e.g., Downs, 410 So. 2d 793; Guilott, 361 So. 2d 1271; Ogden, 331
So. 2d 592.
39. 361 So. 2d 1271.
40. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (2009) (defining the term "separate property"
to include property acquired by the spouse by donation to him individually).

2009]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND INCOME TAX

871

credited to the partner's drawing account at any time and without
the approval of the partnership or any of the other partners. The
Guilott court held that all partnership earnings placed in Mrs.
Guilott's drawing account during the existence of the community
were fruits of her interest in the partnership and, therefore,
constituted community property. 4 '
While the Guilott court held that the partnership income in
Mrs. Guilott's drawing account was community property, the court
also held that the distributed and undistributed amounts in her
capital account were her separate property.42 According to the third
circuit, the amount the partnership placed in Mrs. Guilott's
drawing account should be treated as having been distributed to her
because she could draw amounts from that account at will. It was
as if the partnership had placed her share of the partnership's
earnings in a checking account for her benefit.
During the existence of the community, the partnership formed
a corporation with cash assets debited to the drawing account of
each of the partners. Mrs. Guilott received fifty shares of capital
stock in the corporation in return for $5,000 debited to her
partnership drawing account. The partnership also acquired 1,500
shares of stock in the corporation in exchange for certain
equipment owned by the partnership. The 1,500 shares were later
distributed to each of the partners on the basis of three shares for
every share of stock already owned by the partner. Thus, Mrs.
Guilott received an additional 150 shares from that distribution. In
a later year, Mrs. Guilott received another 300 shares of stock with
a book value of $7,500. Mrs. Guilott's drawing account was
debited $7,500 to pay for the 300 shares. Thus, Mrs. Guilott owned
a total of 500 shares of stock, 350 of which had been acquired with
funds debited from her drawing account, and 150 of which had
been acquired with the equipment the partnership had transferred
to the corporation.
The court held that the 350 shares acquired with funds from
Mrs. Guilott's drawing account were community property because
they were acquired with community income.43 In contrast,
however, the court held that the 150 shares that were acquired with
partnership property were Mrs. Guilott's separate property. As
explained earlier, the Louisiana Civil Code provides that property
acquired with separate property is separate property.44 The court
reasoned that the 150 shares represented a mere change in form of
41. Guilott, 361 So. 2d at 1275.
42. Id. at 1278.
43. Id. at 1276.
44.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341.
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Mrs. Guilott's separate property. In acquiring the 150 shares of
stock with its capital assets, the partnership changed the form of a
portion of Mrs. Guilott's partnership capital account to stock.
Thus, when Mrs. Guilott's stock was redeemed, the money she
received in exchange for the 150 shares of stock continued to be
her separate property.
When the partnership liquidated, it distributed four municipal
bonds valued at $69,064 and cash of $39,500. Mr. Guilott
conceded that $50,000 representing Mrs. Guilott's interest in the
partnership capital account was her separate property. As in the
case of the stock purchased on behalf of Mrs. Guilott and debited
to her drawing account, the court held that the portion of the value
of the municipal bonds representing funds due to her from her
drawing account was community property. Similarly, the court
held that checks drawn on the partnership's checking account and
debited from Mrs. Guilott's drawing account were community
property.
It seems that the partnership in Guilott established two
accounts for each of its partners: (1) a capital account and (2) a
drawing account. Mrs. Guilott's capital account seems to have
included her share of the original capital that had been contributed
to the partnership or income attributable to the partnership interest
that the partnership earned before Mrs. Guilott acquired the
partnership interest. In contrast, the partnership contributed all of
its current income to the partners' drawing accounts in proportion
to their interests in the partnership. It is not certain whether the
partnership retained any of its current earnings in the partners'
capital accounts.
In Downs v. Downs,4 5 the third circuit clarified its position
concerning the characterization of a partnership's undistributed
income. In Downs, Mr. Downs owned an interest in a partnership
as separate property. The partners did not have drawing accounts.
Under the terms of the partnership agreement, however, Mr.
Downs could draw from his capital account at any time. The court
held that the amount of partnership income allocated to Mr.
Downs's capital account was not community property. 46 The court
described the nature of a partner's capital account as follows:
The evidence shows that a partner's capital account is
nothing more than a reflection of the net capital invested by
that partner in the business, together with his share of the
partnership's profits reinvested by him. The accounts are
45. 410 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 375 (La. 1982).
46. Id.
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not separate and distinct entities that can be characterized
as "property". [sic] They exist only on paper as a means of
showing the value of each partner's interest in the
partnership. We find no merit in defendant's contention
that plaintiff's capital account is community property.4 7
Nevertheless the court held that Mrs. Downs was entitled to
one-half of the increase in value of Mr. Down's capital account. At
the time that Downs was decided, the Louisiana Civil Code
provided that on termination of the community, a spouse was
entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the increase in the value
of the other spouse's separate property to the extent that the
increased value was attributable to improvements made with
community funds or the labor of either or both spouses.48 For
purposes of allowing Mrs. Downs one-half of the partnership's
income that had been credited to Mr. Downs's capital account, the
court concluded that "when a husband's share of partnership
profits is made available to him in such a manner that he may
withdraw them from the partnership at any time and for any
purpose, then those profits represent income to him which is
community property during the existence of the community." 49 In
addition, the court noted that Mr. Downs had devoted a great deal
of time and effort to the partnership's business. Accordingly, the
court awarded Mrs. Downs one-half of the amount by which Mr.
Downs's share of the partnership's capital 50and profits had
increased during the existence of the community.
The holding in Downs is difficult to understand. On the one
hand, the court declined to treat a partner's capital account as per
se community property. However, to the extent that the partner's
capital account was enhanced by the partner's share of partnership
profits made available to him in such a manner that he could draw
them from the partnership at any time, the partnership profits were
community property. If Mr. Downs's share of the partnership's
undistributed income was community property when it was earned,
that income would have been counted twice in determining Mrs.
Downs's share of the community property, once when the income
was earned, and a second time when the income was reinvested in
the partnership. The Louisiana Civil Code provides both that each
spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in community property
and its fruits and products, 5' and that on termination and partition
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.at 796.

51.

LA. CIv. CODE art. 2369.2 (2009).

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 (1870), repealedby 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1.

Downs, 410 So. 2d at 799.
Id.
at 801.
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of the community, each spouse is entitled to receive one-half of the
former community property and its fruits or products, including
any income from community property. 52 In addition, the Louisiana
Civil Code provides that if community property is used to benefit
separate property, the spouse who does not own an interest in the
separate property is entitled to one-half of the amount or value of
such property so used upon termination of the community.53 The
Downs court avoided awarding Mrs. Downs both one-half of Mr.
Downs's share of the partnership's undistributed income and onehalf of that income treated as reinvested in the partnership. While
the court reached an equitable result, it offered no rationale for
avoiding the double counting of the same income on partition of
the community. Under Downs, a spouse who does not own an
interest in a partnership should be entitled to receive one-half of
the other spouse's share of that income, one-half of the income
when it is treated as community property, and the other half of the
income when it is treated as reinvested in the partnership.
In Dubuisson v. Moseley,54 the third circuit held that a partner's
share of income that had been placed in the partnership's checking
account was not community property where the partner's interest
in the partnership was separate property. The court explained:
The partnership checking account was not a community
checking account. The community only had an interest in
the partnership, and the partnership checking account did
not become identifiable community funds until withdrawn
for the personal benefit of one of the partners. This is not a
case Where separate and community funds are deposited
and withdrawn in an account. Here, only partnership funds
were deposited in the partnership account, and the only
interest the community had in55 those funds was by virtue of
its interest in the partnership.
While the quoted language indicates that the community had an
interest in the partnership, that interest was only an interest in the
enhanced value of Mr. Dubuisson's partnership interest attributable
to Mr. Dubuisson's undercompensated services provided to the
partnership. Earlier in the opinion, the Dubuisson court, like the

52. Id. art. 807 (allowing a co-owner to demand partition of co-owned
property); id. art. 2369.1 (applying the co-ownership provisions to former
community property after termination of the community).
53. Id. art. 2367.
54. 232 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
55. Id. at 872.
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Downs court, referred
to Mr. Dubuisson's partnership interest as
56
separate property.
The third circuit's opinions in Guillot, Downs, and Dubuisson
seem to treat a partner's share of the partnership's income as
separate property where the interest in the partnership is the
separate property of one of the spouses, unless the spouse who
owns the interest in the partnership has the right to withdraw that
income at any time and for any purpose. The third circuit's
partnership opinions are consistent with Ogden v. Ogden.57 In
Ogden, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that
partnership income did not constitute community property until
that income was distributed to the spouse who held the partnership
interest as separate property. 58 In Ogden, John Ogden had inherited
from his father a one-sixth interest in a partnership that operated a
motion picture theater. Thus, the partnership interest was separate
property. 59 Nevertheless, the court held that Mrs. Ogden was
entitled to one-half of the amount by which the partnership interest
increased in value during the existence of the community.6 0 Under
former article 2408 of the Civil Code, as in effect when the
community in Ogden terminated, a spouse was entitled to the
increase in value of an interest in an entity owned as separate
property of the other spouse to the extent that the increase in value
was attributable to the common labor, expenses, or industry of one
or both spouses.
After Mr. and Mrs. Ogden were divorced, Mrs. Ogden filed
suit for a determination of her share of the community property.
Mrs. Ogden argued that she was entitled to one-half of $10,461.09,
the value of Mr. Ogden's one-sixth interest in the net worth of the
partnership's business, much of which was held in the
partnership's bank account. Mrs. Ogden maintained that because
the partnership income was commingled with cash on deposit at
the time of their marriage, the commingling caused Mr. Ogden's
interest in the account to be considered community property. The
court disagreed for the following reasons:

56. Id. at 871.
57. 331 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). See Guilott v. Guilott, 361 So.
2d 1271 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 363 So. 2d 68 (La. 1978) (citing Ogden,
331 So. 2d 592).
58. The court noted that partnership income did not belong to the partner
until it was actually paid to him. Ogden, 331 So. 2d at 596-97.
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (2009) (separate property includes property
acquired by a spouse by inheritance to him individually).
60. Ogden, 331 So. 2d at 595 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 (1870),
repealedby 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1).
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The Gordon Theatre business was a partnership, and as
such it is a separate legal entity. The defendant, Mr. Ogden,
owns only an undivided interest in the partnership. He has
no interest in the assets of the partnership other than his
interest. All of the income deposited in the partnership
account belonged to the partnership, and not to the partners
in undivided interests.
The only claim that the community can have against this
partnership is for the enhanced value of the interest, owned
by the defendant since he married.6 '
That issue, and the facts in Ogden, were the same as the issue
and facts in Dubuisson, and the first and third circuits reached the
same conclusion as to the characterization of the income. Unlike
the partnerships in Guilott and Downs, the partnership in Ogden
either did not allow partners to withdraw funds from their drawing
accounts at will or did not place its income in the partners' drawing
accounts as that income was earned. The Ogden court held that the
partnership's income did not belong to any of the partners until it
was actually distributed to them. Accordingly, the court held that
none of the partnership's undistributed income constituted
community property.
Nevertheless, when the partnership used its undistributed
income for the benefit of Mr. Ogden, the court treated that portion
of the partnership's income as community property. The
partnership had paid $400 with a check drawn on the partnership's
checking account to purchase forty shares of stock in a family
owned corporation. The $400 purchase price of the stock was
drawn from Mr. Ogden's partnership drawing account and issued
in Mr. Ogden's name. While the first circuit held that none of the
partnership income belonged to Mr. Ogden until it actually was
paid to him, the court held that the stock was community property.
The court stated:
Of course, the defendant [Mr. Ogden] argues that the
$400.00 was not income to him from the partnership, but
merely a transfer of money in his partnership capital
account to Broadmoor Theatres, Inc. for stock. This
argument might hold true if the stock had been placed in
the name of the partnership, for then it would simply be
nothing more than another asset of the partnership;
however, the stock in Broadmoor Theatres, Inc. was issued
in the name of the defendant. Whether the check from the
partnership was issued to the defendant in his name,
61.

Id.
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deposited by him, and a new check issued to Broadmoor
Theatres, Inc. for the purchase of the stock, or whether the
check was issued in the defendant's name and endorsed by
him to Broadmoor Theatres, Inc., or written directly to
Broadmoor Theatres, Inc. on his behalf is of no moment,
because under any of these circumstances the defendant
was receiving income from the partnership, either directly
or indirectly. Since the money that was used to
62 purchase
the stock is community, the stock is community.
Ogden is consistent with Downs and Guilott because the
partner in Ogden owned only a one-sixth partnership interest in a
general partnership. Under Louisiana partnership law, a majority of
the partners in a general partnership must make all decisions
affecting the management of the partnership (including whether or
not to authorize partnership distributions) unless the partners
stipulate otherwise. 63 Thus, Mr. Ogden had no control over the
partnership's distribution policies. The partnership agreement in
Ogden did not provide that a partner could withdraw any amount
in his or her capital account. In contrast, the partnership income
that was allocated to Mrs. Guilott's drawing account and Mr.
Downs's capital account was available for their use at any time.
Accordingly, the Guillot and Downs courts treated that income as
fruits of separate property and, therefore, community property.
The treatment of a partner's share of a partnership's
undistributed income and distributions from a partnership under
Ogden and Dubuisson is inconsistent with the treatment of that
income under federal tax law. As explained earlier, a partnership is
not subject to tax on the income it earns. 64 Instead, each partner
pays tax on that partner's distributive share of partnership
income.6 Thus, a partner is treated as if the partner actually earned
the partner's distributive share of partnership income. If Mr.
Ogden or Mr. Dubuisson had earned the partnership's income
directly, rather than through
6 a partnership, the income would have
been community property.
The treatment of distributions from a partnership under
community property law is also inconsistent with the, manner in
which partnership distributions are treated under federal tax law.
62. Id. at 597.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2807.
64. I.R.C. § 701 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
65. Id. § 702(a).
66. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (defining the term "community property"
to include property acquired during the existence of the community through the
effort, skill, or industry of either spouse).
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Distributions from a partnership to a partner generally are tax free
to the extent that the amount of money distributed to the partner
does not exceed the adjusted basis of the partner's interest in the
partnership.67 The adjusted basis of a partner's interest in a
partnership generally includes the amount of money and the
adjusted basis of property the partner has contributed to the
partnership 68 and the partner's distributive share of items of
partnership income and gain (including tax-exempt income). 69 The
adjusted basis of a partner's interest in the partnership generally is
reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of money and the
adjusted basis of property distributed by the partnership to the
partner and the items of deduction and loss (including expenses
that are not deductible and not properly chargeable to a capital
account). 70 Thus, to the extent that the money distributed to a
partner does not exceed the amount of net income allocated to the
partner, a distribution from the partnership to the partner is treated
as a mere return of capital and not income to the distributee
partner. In contrast, the Louisiana courts have held that partnership
distributions of income are treated as community property.
B. UndistributedIncome of an S Corporation
A Louisiana LLC also may be taxed as an S corporation. 71 It is
likely that a Louisiana court will apply case law concerning the
status of undistributed income of an S corporation under Louisiana
community property law in determining whether the undistributed
income of an LLC taxed as an S corporation is the separate
67. I.R.C. § 731(a) (2002).
Id. § 722 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
Id. § 705(a)(1) (2002).
Id. § 705(a)(2).
A Louisiana LLC is an unincorporated association. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1301(A)(10) (1994 & Supp. 2009). Under the check-the-box
regulations, an unincorporated business entity that is organized under the laws of
any state government is eligible to make an election to be classified as a
partnership if it has two or more members, a disregarded entity if it has one
member, or an association taxable as a corporation if the LLC is not a jointstock company, an insurance company, a business conducting banking activities,
or a business entity that is taxable as a corporation under a provision of the
Internal Revenue Code other than section 7701(a)(3). Treas. Reg. §§ 301.77012(b), 301.7701-3(b)(1) (2008). A Louisiana LLC that is eligible to be classified
as a partnership or disregarded entity is classified as a partnership if it has two or
more members or a disregarded entity if it has one member unless the LLC
makes an election to be classified as a corporation. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1). If an
LLC is classified as a corporation, it will be taxed under subchapter C of the
Internal Revenue Code unless the LLC is eligible to elect and makes an election
under section 1362(a) to be an S corporation.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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property of the spouse whose interest in the LLC is separate
property. Only one case could be found in which a Louisiana court
decided that issue, and it is not certain whether the court was
correct. In McKneely v. McKneely, 72 the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal held that the undistributed income of an S
corporation whose stock is the separate property of a spouse does
not constitute community property unless and until that income
actually is distributed to the spouse-shareholder.73
Like the Louisiana cases concerning the characterization of the
undistributed income of a partnership as community or separate
property, McKneely's treatment of the S corporation's income
under community property law is inconsistent with the treatment of
that income under federal income tax law. The income of an S
corporation is generally computed in the same manner as the
income of an individual."7
72. 764 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
73. Id.
74. I.R.C. § 1363(b) (2002 & Supp. 2008). An S corporation may be
required to pay a corporate-level tax on its net recognized built-in gains and
excess passive income. Id. §§ 1374, 1375. The built-in gains tax applies to an S
corporation's net recognized built-in gain at a rate equal to the highest rate of tax
that applies to corporate income under Code section 11. Id. § 1374(a), (b)(1)
(2002). The built-in gains tax applies only in certain limited situations. First, the
built-in gains tax applies only to gain recognized by an S corporation on the sale
or exchange of property the S corporation acquired in a year in which the S
corporation was a C corporation or property acquired from a C corporation if the
adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the S corporation was determined
in whole or in part by reference to the adjusted basis of the property in the hands
of the C corporation at the time it was acquired. Id. § 1374(c)(1), (d)(3), (5)-(6).
The built-in gains tax also does not apply if the property that is sold has been
held by the S corporation for more than ten years after the corporation's
subchapter S election became effective, or, in the case of property acquired from
a C corporation with an adjusted basis determined in whole or in part to the C
corporation's basis in the property, if the S corporation holds the property for
more than ten years after the later of the date that the S corporation acquired the
property or the date the corporation's subchapter S election became effective. Id.
§ 1374(d)(3), (6)-(7). The amount of gain subject to the built-in gains tax is
limited to the built-in gain recognized on the sale or exchange of property
potentially subject to the tax, reduced by the built-in loss recognized on the sale
or exchange of property acquired before the first day of the taxable year in
which the corporation's subchapter S election became effective or, in the case of
property acquired from a C corporation, on the date that the S corporation
acquired the property. Id. § 1374(a), (d)(4). For this purpose, the term "built-in
gain" means the amount by which the fair market value of the property at the
beginning of the taxable year in which the corporation became an S corporation
exceeded the adjusted basis of the property at that time, or in the case of
property acquired from a C corporation with an adjusted basis determined in
whole or in part by reference to the basis of the property in the hands of the C
corporation, on the date the S corporation acquired the property. Id. §
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1374(d)(3)(B), (8). The term "built-in loss" means the amount by which the
adjusted basis of property acquired by an S corporation before the first taxable
year in which the corporation's subchapter S election became effective exceeds
the fair market value of the property at that time or, in the case of property
acquired from a C corporation with an adjusted basis determined in whole or in
part by reference to the C corporation's adjusted basis in the property, at the
beginning of the taxable year in which the property was acquired. Id. §
1374(d)(4). Furthermore, the amount of gain subject to the built-in gains tax is
limited to the amount by which the unrealized built-in gain with respect to all of
the S corporation's property potentially subject to the built-in gains tax exceeds
the net recognized built-in gain for prior taxable years beginning in the year in
.which the corporation's subchapter S election became effective or, in the case of
property acquired from a C corporation with an adjusted basis determined in
whole or in part by reference to the C corporation's adjusted basis, at the time
the property was acquired. Id. § 1374(c)(2), (d)(8). The net unrealized built-in
gain is the amount by which the fair market value of all the property acquired as
of the first day of the taxable year in which the corporation's subchapter S
election became effective or, in the case of property acquired from a C
corporation with an adjusted basis determined in whole or in part by reference to
the C corporation's adjusted basis, at the time the property was acquired,
exceeds the aggregate adjusted bases of such assets. Id. § 1374(d)(1), (8). The
amount of gain subject to the built-in gains tax for any taxable year also is
limited to the lesser of: (1) the amount that would be taxable income of the S
corporation for the taxable year if only built-in gains and built-in losses were
taken into account; or (2) the corporation's taxable income for the taxable year
determined without regard to any net operating losses and without regard to the
dividends received deduction. Id. §§ 172, 241-249, 1374(d)(2), 1375(b)(1)(B)
(2002 & Supp. 2008). The net unrealized built-in gain is also reduced by net
operating loss carry forwards from years in which the corporation was a C
corporation. Id. § 1374(d)(5)(B) (2002). The built-in gains tax is reduced by
certain business credit carryovers from years in which the corporation was a C
corporation. Id. § 1374(b)(3)(B). Even if an S corporation is subject to the builtin gains tax on the sale or exchange of its property, the S corporation's
shareholders also include in income their pro rata shares of all the gain
recognized on the sale of the property in question. Id. § 1366(a)(1)(A) (2002 &
Supp. 2008).
The tax on the net excess passive income of an S corporation only applies in
a year in which the S corporation has either earnings and profits from years in
which the corporation was a C corporation or earnings and profits that it
acquired from a C corporation as a result of a corporate reorganization in which
less than all of the gain on the transfer of the C corporations' assets to the S
corporation and more than 25% of the S corporation's gross receipts are passive
income. Id. § 1375(a). The tax is imposed at a rate equal to the highest rate of
tax that applies to a C corporation under section 11 on the S corporation's excess
net passive income. Id. The amount of an S corporation's excess net passive
income is computed by multiplying the S corporation's net passive income for
the taxable year times a fraction, the numerator of which is the amount by which
the corporation's passive investment income for the taxable year exceeds 25%
of its gross receipts for the taxable year, and the denominator of which is the
corporation's passive investment income for the year. Id. § 1375(b)(1). For this
purpose, the term "passive investment income" generally includes gross receipts
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Nevertheless, an S corporation is generally not subject to the
federal income tax on the income it earns.7 5 Instead, each
shareholder of an S corporation computes his or her income tax
liability by including the shareholder's pro rata share of the S
corporation's items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit.76
In requiring an S corporation shareholder to report his or her share
of the corporation's income on the shareholder's income tax return,
subchapter S treats a shareholder's pro rata share of an S
corporation's income as if the income were earned by the
shareholder, not by the corporation.
Subchapter S also treats an S corporation shareholder as if the
shareholder contributed the shareholder's share of the S
corporation's net undistributed income back to the corporation as a
contribution to capital. Subchapter S accomplishes this result by
increasing the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock by the
amount of the corporation's undistributed income allocated to that
shareholder. 77 Under federal tax law, a contribution of money by a
shareholder to a corporation increases the adjusted basis of the
shareholder's stock.7
An S corporation that was a C corporation in any prior year
may have accumulated earnings and profits from the years in
which it was a C corporation. The existence of earnings and profits
may affect the tax treatment of distributions from an S corporation.
In general, a distribution from an S corporation to a shareholder is
not taxable to the extent that the distribution does not exceed the

derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or
exchanges of stock or securities (where gross receipts of such sales or exchanges
are taken into account only to the extent of the gains therefrom). Id. §§
1362(d)(3)(C), 1375(b)(3). Net passive income is passive investment income,
reduced by the allowable deductions that are clearly related to the production of
passive investment income, other than net operating losses and the dividends
received deduction. Id. §§ 172, 241-249, 1375(b)(2). Gain that is subject to the
built-in gains tax is not taken into account in determining an S corporation's net
passive investment income. Id. § 1375(b)(3).
75. Id_ § 1363(a).
76. Id. § 1366(a) (determination of S corporations shareholder's income tax
liability).
77. Compare id. § 1367(a) (adjusted basis of an S corporation shareholder's
stock increased in an amount equal to the shareholder's pro rata share of the S
corporation's items of income and gain and reduced (but not below zero) by the
amount of distributions from the S corporation to the shareholder and the
shareholder's pro rata share of the S corporation's items of deduction and loss)
with id. § 358(a) (basis of shareholder's stock increased by the amount of money
the shareholder contributes to the corporation (applicable to S corporations
under section 1371 (a) (2002)).
78. Id. § 358(a).
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adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock in the corporation. 79 The
adjusted basis of an S corporation shareholder's stock generally
includes the amount of money and the adjusted basis of the
property contributed by the shareholder to the corporation and the
shareholder's pro rata share of the S corporation's net income that
was included in the shareholder's income each year and was not
distributed to the shareholder in any year. 8 Thus, distributions
from an S corporation to a shareholder are generally tax free to the
extent that the shareholder has included the corporation's net
income in the shareholder's income for the current or prior years
and has not already received a distribution of that income.
If an S corporation has accumulated earnings and profits, the S
corporation must keep track of its net income that was not
distributed to shareholders in prior years. The term used by the
Internal Revenue Code to describe the bookkeeping device that
keeps track of a corporation's undistributed net income earned
during the years in which the corporation is an S corporation is the
"accumulated adjustments account" (sometimes referred to as
"AAA"). 8 ' In general, distributions to a shareholder from an S
corporation with earnings and profits are tax free to the extent that
the amount distributed does not exceed the adjusted basis of the
shareholder's stock in the corporation and to the extent that the
amount distributed does not exceed the AAA.82 When an S
corporation has only one shareholder, the AAA is computed in a
manner that is similar to the manner in which the basis of the
shareholder's stock is adjusted.83 Thus, a distribution from an S
corporation to its sole shareholder is generally included in the
79. Id. § 1368(b).
80. Id. § 358(a) (adjusted basis of stock in an S corporation includes the
amount of money and the adjusted basis of property contributed by the
shareholder to the corporation, decreased by the amount of money, the fair
market value of property distributed to the shareholder, and the amount of
liabilities assumed by the corporation in connection with the transfer of property
in exchange for the stock); id. § 1367(a) (adjusted basis of an S corporation
shareholder's stock increased by the shareholder's pro rata share of the S
corporation's items of income and gain and reduced (but not below zero) by taxfree distributions from the corporation to the shareholder and the shareholder's
pro rata share of the S corporation's items of deduction and loss).
81. Id. § 1368(e)(1).
82. Id. § 1368(b), (c)(1).
83. There are two important differences between the computation of the
AAA and the adjustments that are made to the adjusted basis of an S
corporation's stock. Unlike the basis of the shareholder's stock, the AAA is not
adjusted for income that is exempt from tax or the expenses related to taxexempt income of the S corporation, and the amount in the AAA may fall below
zero. Compare id. § 1367(a) (adjustments to the basis of shareholder's stock)
with id. § 1368(e)(1)(A) (adjustments to the AAA).

2009]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND INCOME TAX

883

shareholder's income only to the extent that the amount of the
distribution exceeds the S corporation's AAA.
In McKneely, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held
that amounts distributed to a shareholder from an S corporation's
AAA were community property. The McKneely court
acknowledged that its treatment of the undistributed income of an
S corporation under community property law is inconsistent with
the treatment of that income under federal income tax law.
The holding in McKneely also is inconsistent with the holding
in Downs and Guilott. In McKneely, Mr. McKneely was entitled to
draw his one-half share of the S corporation's undistributed
income at any time. When Mr. McKneely's brother was asked why
he did not notify the police when he discovered that Mr. McKneely
had withdrawn $110,000 from the S corporation's checking and
savings accounts, the brother replied, "Well once the check cleared
the bank, I noted that he was entitled to it-he was entitled to half
of the funds that were there and so I thought he was entitled to
it."'84 Indeed, the brothers had a history of drawing money from the
corporate accounts whenever they needed it.85 Unlike the Downs
court, the McKneely court disregarded the fact that Mr. McKneely
had control over whether and when he would receive distributions
of the S corporation's income. In this respect, the McKneely court
treated the undistributed income of an S corporation in the same
manner as the undistributed income of a C corporation when the
stock in the corporation constitutes the separate property of one of
the spouses.
When stock in a C corporation is the separate property of a
spouse, the income of the C corporation is not community property
unless and until that income is distributed as a dividend to the
shareholder-spouse.8 6 In the case of a C corporation, it is not
relevant whether the shareholder-spouse has control over dividend
policy. As long as dividends are not actually distributed by the C
corporation to the shareholder-spouse, the undistributed income of
the corporation is not community property.
For example, in Pellerin v. Pellerin, James Pellerin acquired
25% of the common stock in a C comoration, Pellerin Laundry
Machinery Sales Co., Inc. (PLMSCO), as a gift from his father
84. Transcript of Record at 30, McKneely v. McKneely, 764 So. 2d 1157
(La. App. 1st Cir. 2000) (No. 9601002).
85. Id.at 22-25.
86. See, e.g., Pellerin v. Pellerin, 550 So. 2d 1250 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
87. Id.
88. The Pellerin court did not specify that PLMSCO was a C corporation.
However, PLMSCO must have been a C corporation because the court stated
that its income was subject to a double tax. Id. at 1254. Moreover, when
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and grandfather before he was married to Mrs. Pellerin on July 19,
1975. Thus, James's 25% interest in PLMCSO was separate
property. The remaining 75% of the stock in PLMSCO was owned
by each of James's three siblings in equal shares. In other words,
James's father and grandfather gave 25% of the stock in the
corporation to each of the four siblings. After Mr. and Mrs.
Pellerin were married, the general manager of PLMSCO resigned,
and James's father convinced James to manage the corporation in
lieu of attending graduate business school. At the same time,
PLMSCO's sales manager received 8% of PLMSCO's stock,
reducing each of the siblings' stock in the corporation to 23%.
James became the president of PLMSCO in May 1976, at
which time the corporation was recapitalized. James's siblings
each exchanged their common stock in PLMSCO for preferred
stock, and James acquired a controlling interest in the voting
common stock of the corporation. The documents concerning the
plan of recapitalization recited that James's siblings agreed to give
James a controlling interest in the voting common stock of the
corporation and an increased share in the future appreciation and
growth of the corporation in appreciation of his services in
managing the corporation and as an incentive for James to manage
the company in such a way as to assure a substantial annual
income from their continued interest in the corporation.
Pellerin involved several issues concerning the partition of
community property as a result of the Pellerins' divorce. Mrs.
Pellerin argued that James's increased ownership interest in the
future growth of the corporation was a form of compensation
granted to James in return for making his services available and,
therefore, constituted community property. As explained earlier,
community property includes property acquired during the
existence of the community through the effort, skill, or industry of
either spouse. 89 James argued that he did not receive any additional
shares of stock as a result of the recapitalization and that the
controlling interest of stock ownership cannot exist apart from the
stock itself. James also noted that no value could be assigned to his
controlling interest. James maintained that PLMSCO's success was

PLMSCO was recapitalized, a new class of preferred stock was issued. Id. at
1252. An S corporation may not have more than one class of stock. I.R.C. §
1361(b)(1)(D) (2002 & Supp. 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(1)(1) (2008). Thus,
PLMSCO was not an S corporation. PLMSCO also was not a real estate
investment trust ("REIT") because it did not meet the requirements to be a REIT
under Code section 861(a)(1). Thus, PLMSCO must have been a C corporation.
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (2009).
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dependent on another corporation whose products PLMSCO sold.
Moreover, James contended that his controlling interest was only
temporary because his siblings had the right to exchange their
preferred stock for common stock if they became active in the
business.
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the
increase in James's controlling interest in PLMSCO was not an
asset itself, but was tied as an integral part of the position of
president of the corporation and served as an incentive for James to
serve as president of PLMSCO. 90 Thus, James's common stock
retained its characterization as separate property, and Mrs. Pellerin
was entitled to the increase in value, if any, in James's PLMSCO
stock during the existence of the community to the extent that the
increase in value was attributable to James's uncompensated labor
or industry. 91 As explained earlier, the party claiming
reimbursement for the enhancement in value of separate property
upon dissolution of the marriage has the burden of proving that the
increase in value is attributable to the uncompensated common
labor and industry of the spouses. 92 The court held that Mrs.
Pellerin had failed to meet her burden of proof because, in its
opinion, James was adequately compensated
for his labor and
93
industry by virtue of his salary and bonus.
Mrs. Pellerin also claimed that PLMSCO unreasonably
withheld dividends on its common stock, which would have been
community property if they had been distributed. The court did not
consider the fact that Mr. Pellerin could have required PLMSCO to
distribute dividends at any time. Instead, the court accepted the
testimony of expert witnesses that distributions from the
corporation would be subject to a double tax at a high rate. If
PLMSCO had distributed dividends to James during the Pellerins'
marriage, the distributions would have been subject to tax at the
rate of 50%. For every $100 in dividends James received, $50
would have had to be paid in taxes. Another CPA described the
double tax problem. A C corporation is subject to tax on its own
income. 94 The income of a C corporation is subject to tax a second
time, at the shareholder- level if and when it is distributed as a
dividend to that shareholder. 9B Moreover, an accountant testified
that it was typical of small family corporations not to pay
90. Pellerin, 550 So. 2d at 1253.
91. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2368.
92. Guarisco v. Guarisco, 526 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988),
writ denied, 523 So. 2d 1337 (La. 1989).
93. Pellerin, 550 So. 2d at 1253.
94. I.R.C. § 11(a) (2002).
95. Id. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(a), (c)(1), 316(a) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
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dividends on common shares. There was additional testimony that
PLMSCO retained its earnings for exposure to at least two law
suits. Accordingly, the court held that Mrs. Pellerin failed to prove
that the refusal to pay dividends was capricious or that 96the
corporation's earnings were retained to deprive the community.
It is not certain whether the holding in McKneely will be
followed by other courts. The Pellerin court justified a C
corporation's retention of earnings, in part, because of the tax
burden that would result if the corporation's income had been
distributed. In contrast, the corporation in McKneely was an S
corporation. As explained earlier, distributions of an S corporation
are generally tax free to the shareholders to the extent that the
amount distributed already has been subject to tax. It would seem
that the partnership cases are more like the McKneely case.
C. UndistributedIncome of a DisregardedEntity
As of this writing, no cases could be found in which a
Louisiana court addressed the treatment of the undistributed
income of a disregarded entity where the interest in the entity is the
separate property of the entity's owner. Where the owner of the
interest in a disregarded entity is an individual, it is likely that the
disregarded entity will be organized as an LLC.97 In Moise v.
Moise, the court did not indicate whether the income received on
the Verizon lease was distributed to Mr. Moise. It is not certain
whether Louisiana courts will treat an LLC like a partnership or a
corporation for purposes of determining whether the undistributed
income of an LLC is community property in cases where the
interest in the LLC is separate property.
Like a partnership or S corporation, a disregarded entity
generally is not subject to tax on its own income. Instead, the entity
96. Pellerin,50 So. 2d at 1254.
97. As explained earlier, a Louisiana LLC with only one owner will be
taxed as a disregarded entity unless the LLC makes an election under the checkthe-box regulations to be taxed as a corporation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a)
(2008). There are two other entities that may be classified as disregarded
entities, a qualified real estate investment trust subsidiary ("qualified REIT
subsidiary") or a qualified subchapter S subsidiary ("QSub"). I.R.C. §§
856(i)(1)(A) (qualified REIT subsidiary), 1361(b)(3)(B) (QSub). The stock in a
qualified REIT subsidiary or a QSub, however, may not be owned by an
individual. See id. § 856(i)(2) (defining the term "qualified REIT subsidiary" as
a corporation if 100% of the stock of the corporation is held by a REIT if the
corporation is not a taxable REIT subsidiary); id. § 1361(b)(3)(B) (defining the
term "QSub" as a domestic corporation that is not an ineligible corporation if
100% of the stock in the corporation is held by an S corporation and the S
corporation elects to treat the corporation as a QSub).
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is disregarded as a separate entity from its owner, and the
disregarded entity's items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and
credit are included on the owner's income tax return for the year in
which the items are earned or incurred. 98 For tax purposes, the
owner of an interest in a disregarded entity does not have a basis in
the interest. Instead, a sale of all or a part of an interest in an LLC
that is classified as a disregarded entity is treated as a sale of a
proportionate interest in each of the LLC's assets. 99 Distributions
of a disregarded entity's income are not subject to tax because
transactions between a disregarded entity and its owner are not
included for income tax purposes.
As the sole owner of an interest in an LLC that is classified as a
disregarded entity, the owner of the interest has absolute control
over whether and when the LLC will distribute its income. If a
court treats the undistributed income of an LLC classified as a
disregarded entity like the undistributed income of a partnership,
the undistributed income will constitute community property even
if the LLC is the separate property of one of the spouses. On the
other hand, if a court treats an LLC like an S corporation, then
under McKneely, the LLC's undistributed income will be separate
property if the interest in the LLC is separate property. As
explained earlier, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not decided
whether the undistributed income of a passthrough entity allocable
to an interest in the entity is community property or separate
property if the interest in the entity is separate property. It is hoped
that the supreme court will hold that a spouse's share of the
undistributed income of all passthrough entities is separate
property if the interest in the entity is separate property.
D. Should the UndistributedIncome of a PassthroughEntity Be
Treated as SeparatePropertyor Community Property?
In general, the undistributed income of a passthrough entity
should not be treated as community property if the interest in the
entity is separate property. In McKneely, the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal reached the right result but did not provide
the best rationale for distinguishing an S corporation's
undistributed income from the undistributed income of a
partnership. As explained earlier, the McKneely court held that the
third circuit's opinion in Guilott was not relevant in determining
the character of an S corporation's undistributed income because
the undistributed income in Guilott had been placed in Mrs.
98.
99.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a).
Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434.
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Guilott's drawing account. In contrast, Mr. McKneely's share of
the S corporation's undistributed income had been placed in the
corporation's accumulated adjustments account. The McKneely
court's distinction between the AAA and a partner's drawing
account is similar to the third circuit's treatment of a partner's
capital account in Downs, in which the court held that a partner's
capital account is not community property where the partner's
interest in the partnership is separate property. The third circuit
concluded that a partner's capital account exists "only on paper as
the value of each partner's interest in the
a means of '1showing
00
partnership."
The Texas Court of Appeals provided a much more satisfying
distinction between an S corporation and a partnership in Thomas
v. Thomas.10 1 Like the McKneely court, the Thomas court held that
the undistributed income of an S corporation is not community
property where the interest in the corporation is the separate
property of one of the spouses. In Thomas, Mr. Thomas owned
16% of the stock in a family owned S corporation as separate
property. Mrs. Thomas argued that because an S corporation is
taxed as a partnership and community property had been used to
pay the tax on the S corporation's undistributed income, that
income should be treated as community property. The court
disagreed.
The Thomas court observed that federal tax law recognizes that
a corporation's election to be taxed under subchapter S does not
convert a corporation into a partnership.' 0 2 Moreover, the court
determined that the community benefits from the subchapter S
election reduces the community's income tax liability.
Distributions from an S corporation are tax-free to the community
and deductions, losses, and tax credits attributable to the S
corporation may be claimed by the spouses on their joint income
tax return. 1 3 Furthermore, the court noted:
Upholding the trial court's order in this case [treating Mr.
Thomas's share of the S corporation's undistributed income
as community property] could lead to undesirable and
unpredictable results. It would tend to engraft upon our
100. Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d 793, 796 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
414 So. 2d 375 (La. 1982).
101. 738 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
102. Id. at 344 (citing United States v. Richardson, 469 F.2d 349 (10th Cir.
1972)); United States v. Silverman, 359 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Neal v.
United States, 313 F. Supp. 393 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Wilhelm v. United States, 257
F. Supp. 16 (D. Wyo. 1966).
103. Thomas, 738 S.W.2d at 344-45.
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community property system the manifest complexities of
federal tax law. If, by paying taxes, the community
acquired an interest in a Subchapter S corporation's
retained earnings, it presumably would also acquire an
interest in property purchased with the reinvestment of
those earnings. The bright line dividing the corporate estate
from the marital estate would be dimmed. Such a result
would not bode well for the future of this highly desirable
corporate form. 104
The rationale in Thomas also should apply in determining
whether the undistributed income of a partnership or LLC is
separate or community property. Nevertheless, the third circuit's
treatment of a partnership's undistributed income as community
property seems reasonable in cases where the spouse who owns the
interest in the entity as separate property has the ability to
withdraw his or her share of partnership profits at any time. Where
a passthrough entity has placed some or all of its undistributed
income aside for a person who owns an interest in the entity to
draw upon that income at any time, the entity has no need for the
income and there is no need to treat that income as if it had not
already been distributed to the owner.
It is not reasonable, however, to treat the undistributed income
of a partnership or other passthrough entity as community property
merely because the spouse who owns the interest in the entity as
separate property has a controlling interest in the entity and
therefore has the power to require the entity to distribute its
income. Partnerships, like corporations and LLCs, are separate
entities from their owners. A partner, like a shareholder or LLC
member, does not own any interest in partnership property.'0 5 The
retained earnings of a partnership, corporation, or LLC belong to
°6
the entity, not to the persons who own interests in the entity.'
Thus, the undistributed income of a passthrough entity organized
under state law as a partnership, S corporation, or LLC is not the
property of a person who owns the interest in the entity. While the
owner may be taxed on a passthrough entity's undistributed
104. Id. at 345.
105. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801 (2009) (defining a partnership as a
juridical person distinct from its owners) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:41
(1994 & Supp. 2009) (corporation has powers to sue and be sued in its own
name and to own and dispose of its own property) and id. § 12:1329 (member
has no interest in LLC's property).
106. See, e.g., McClanahan v. McClanahan, 868 So. 2d 844, 848-49 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2004); Taylor v. Taylor, 772 So. 2d 891, 893 (La. App. 2d Cir.
2000).

890

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

income, the tax consequences do not change the nature of that
income for purposes of determining the ownership of the income
as either separate or community property.
Treating a passthrough entity's undistributed income as
community property merely because a person owns a controlling
interest in the entity as separate property might require the entity to
distribute one-half of its income to satisfy the claims of the spouse
who does not own the interest in the entity. Where a member,
partner, or shareholder owns a controlling interest in the entity, a
required distribution could drain the entity of significant resources.
Such a distribution could cause significant harm to the entity and
its business, the other owners, employees, and creditors of the
entity. If a business organization is required to distribute a
significant amount of its retained earnings, the entity may not have
sufficient working capital to pay for its day-to-day business
operations. If an entity has invested its retained earnings in
property, the entity may be required to sell assets at an inopportune
time to satisfy the claims of a spouse. Moreover, some
distributions are unlawful. A Louisiana corporation may not pay a
dividend when the corporation is insolvent or would be made
insolvent if it paid the dividend. 0 7 A Louisiana LLC may not make
a distribution if, after giving effect to the distribution, the LLC
would not be able to pay its debts as they become due or the LLC's
assets would be less than its liabilities. 08 Similarly, a partner in
commendam may not receive distributions of partnership capital 09
or
profits if the distribution would render the partnership insolvent.'
There are many reasons for an entity to retain its earnings. In
Pellerin, the court justified the retention of the corporation's
earnings, in part, as insurance for payment of potential claims in
connection with law suits. An entity may also retain earnings to
expand the business and enhance the future earnings that will inure
to the benefit of the entity's owners, suppliers, customers, and
employees. If such retained earnings are treated as community
property and required to be distributed to a spouse on termination
of the community, the distribution could jeopardize the entity's

107. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:63(A) (1994). The Louisiana LLC law also
prohibits the LLC from making distributions if, after accounting for the
distribution and the liabilities to the to the LLC's creditors, the LLC would not
have sufficient assets to satisfy preferential fights to distributions payable to
other members on dissolution of the LLC that are superior to the rights of the
member receiving the distribution unless the LLC's articles of organization or a
written operating agreement provides otherwise. Id.
108. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1327(A) (1994 & Supp. 2009).
109. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2842.
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business opportunities to the detriment of the other owners,
employees, and suppliers of the business.
The foregoing concerns are not relevant, however, if and to the
extent that the entity has placed all or a portion the owner's share
of its undistributed profits at the disposal of the owner. In that case,
the entity essentially has declared that it does not need or plan to
use that portion of the undistributed income. Of course, any
amount of a passthrough entity's undistributed or distributed
income that represents the separate property of a spouse because it
was earned before the commencement
of the community is that
0
spouse's separate property."
Nevertheless, treating the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity as community property in cases where the
interest in the entity is the separate property of a spouse could
require the spouse who owns the interest to have to transfer 100%
of that income to the other spouse on termination of the
community. If the undistributed income of an entity is treated as
community property, then the same undistributed income should
be treated as having been contributed back to the entity. In that
case, the same undistributed income will be treated as community
property twice, once because the spouse to whom the income was
allocated had control over whether the income would be
distributed, and a second time when it is transferred back to the
entity. Article 2366 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that on
termination of the community, a spouse is entitled to one-half of
the amount or value of community property that has been used for
the acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of separate property
of the other spouse. In Downs v. Downs,II the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that Mr. Downs's share of the
undistributed income of a partnership constituted community
property, even though Mr. Downs's interest in the partnership was
separate property, because the partnership agreement gave him the
ability to withdraw the funds at any time and for any purpose. At
the same time, the court held that Mr. Downs was required to
reimburse Mrs. Downs for one-half of the increase in value of Mr.
Downs's share of the capital and undivided profits of the
partnership during the time of their marriage.

110. See, e.g., Denegre v. Denegre, 30 La. Ann. 275 (La. 1878) (on
dissolution of a partnership, amounts representing a spouse's share of
partnership capital were the separate property of the spouse who owned the
interest as separate property).
111. 410 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 375 (La.
1982).
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A spouse should not be entitled to include the same
undistributed income of a passthrough entity twice in the inventory
of community property when the community terminates. If so, on
partition of the community, the spouse who does not own the
interest in an entity holding undistributed income would be entitled
to receive 100% of the undistributed earnings. Thus, for every
$100 of undistributed income of a passthrough entity allocable to a
spouse whose interest in the entity is separate property, $100
would be payable to the other spouse on termination of the
community. A spouse living under a community property regime
in Louisiana has an undivided one-half ownership interest in
community property, 112 not a 100% interest in community
property.
On the other hand, excluding the undistributed income of an
entity from community property would deprive the spouse who
does not own an interest in the entity of any of the undistributed
income even though the non-owning spouse may be liable for the
tax on one-half of that income. 1 3 Mrs. McKneely argued that the
undistributed income of the S corporation should be treated as
community property because she was liable for the tax on one-half
of that income. Nevertheless, the amount of the liability for tax on
one-half of the undistributed income is smaller than 100% of the
undistributed income. As of this writing, the maximum rate of
federal income tax that applies to the taxable income of an
individual is 35%. 114 The maximum rate of state tax that applies to
the Louisiana tax table income of an individual is 6%. "' Thus, the
combined federal and state income tax rate that applies to the
income of an individual is 41% (35% federal tax rate + 6% state
income tax rate). Accordingly, for every $100 of a passthrough
entity's undistributed income allocable to a spouse whose interest
in the entity is the separate property of one spouse, the other
spouse may be liable for, at most, $20.50 (41% of $50, (one-half of
the $100 of undistributed income)). The economic equities lie in
favor of treating a passthrough entity's undistributed income as the
separate property of the spouse whose interest in the entity is
separate property.
In Downs, the court counted Mr. Downs's share of the
partnership's undistributed income only once in determining the
amount that Mrs. Downs was entitled to receive on termination of
112.
113.
114.
115.
No. 51

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336.
See infra notes 117-202 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § l(a)-(e) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:296(C) (2001), repealed by 2002 La. Acts.
§2.

2009]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND INCOME TAX

893

the community. The Downs court, however, did not provide a

reason for counting Mr. Downs's share of the partnership's
undistributed income as community property only once.1 16 It is
hoped that Louisiana courts will not treat a passthrough entity's
undistributed income twice. As explained earlier, the undistributed
income of a passthrough entity could be treated as community
property a second time, when the income is distributed.
II. RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR TAXES PAID ON UNDISTRIBUTED
INCOME OF A PASSTHROUGH ENTITY

As of this writing, no cases could be found in which a
Louisiana court has determined whether a spouse is entitled to
receive a reimbursement from the community for the taxes paid on
one-half of the undistributed income of a passthrough entity
allocated to the interest in the entity owned by the other spouse as
separate property. The determination is likely to turn on whether
the liability for the tax is a community or separate obligation. If the
spouses file a joint income tax return, the liability for the tax on the
undistributed income of a passthrough entity is a community
obligation. To the extent that the tax is paid with community
property, the spouse who does not own the interest in the entity
should not be entitled to reimbursement of any of the taxes paid on
the entity's undistributed income. On the other hand, there may be
a question as to whether a spouse is entitled to reimbursement of
116. Downs was decided under former article 2408 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, which was repealed by the 1980 revisions to the Louisiana community
property law. 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1. Former article 2408 provided:
Art. 2408. Division of increase or improvements of separate property:
When the separate property of either the husband or the wife has been
increased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or
her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the
increase or ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase or
ameliorations be the result of the common labor, expenses, or industry;
but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved that the increase is due
only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in value of property, or
to the changes of trade.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1. Before
the 1980 revisions, there was no provision like current article 2366, which
allows a spouse to receive one-half of the amount or value of community
property used for the benefit of separate property. Nevertheless, the pre-1980
Louisiana community property regime, like current Louisiana Civil Code article
2339, provided that the fruits of separate property were community property
unless the spouse who owned the separate property reserved such fruits as
separate property by a declaration made in an authentic act or under private
signature duly acknowledged. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2402 (1870), repealed by 1979
La. Acts No. 709, § 1.
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community property used to pay the tax on that spouse's share of
one-half of the entity's undistributed income if the spouse files a
separate income tax return. When the spouses file separate income
tax returns, it is likely that the determination of whether the nonowning spouse is entitled to reimbursement for any of the tax paid
will depend on whether the non-owning spouse is personally liable
under federal and state income tax law for the tax on one-half of
the undistributed income. This Part discusses the right to
reimbursement of community property used to pay the taxes and
the right to reimbursement of separate property used to pay the
taxes in cases where the spouses file either a joint or separate
income tax returns.
A. JointIncome Tax Returns, Community Property Used to Pay the
Tax
When a joint federal income tax return is filed, each spouse is
jointly and severally liable for the aggregate tax liability reported
on the joint return. 117 The liability of each spouse is joint and
solidary when a joint Louisiana income tax return is filed.118 If the
tax liability on the undistributed income of a passthrough entity is
not paid and the couple has filed a joint return, the IRS or the
Louisiana Department of Revenue generally may recover the entire
amount of the unpaid tax from either spouse, even if the
undistributed income in question is separate property, by seizing
either community property or the spouse's separate property to
satisfy the tax deficiency.' r9
An obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a
community property regime for the common interest of the spouses0
or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation.12
Because each spouse is personally liable for the entire income tax
attributable to a joint return, the tax liability is a community
obligation. Under Louisiana community property law, a spouse is
117. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2002 & Supp. 2008). But see id. § 6015 (relieving
an "innocent spouse" from joint and several liability for an understatement of
tax on a joint return that is attributable to the other spouse).
118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:101(B)(1) (2001). But see id. § 47:101(B)(7)
(relieving an innocent spouse from joint and solidary liability for an
understatement of tax on a joint Louisiana state income tax return).
119. But see I.R.C. § 6015 (relieving a spouse of liability for an
understatement or underpayment of tax on a joint return if the spouse meets the
requirements for innocent spouse status or is eligible for liability only with
respect to tax attributable to that spouse's items of income). A discussion of
section 6015 is beyond the scope of this Article.
120. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360 (2009).
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not entitled to reimbursement of any community property that is
used to satisfy a community obligation.' 2 ' Thus, on termination of
the community, the spouse who did not own any interest in a
passthrough entity should not be entitled to a reimbursement of any
of the community property used to pay the tax on the entity's
undistributed income.
When separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a
community obligation, that spouse is entitled, on termination of the
community, to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value
that the separate property had at the time it was used.' 22 Thus,
where there is an understatement or underpayment of tax with
respect to a joint return and the spouse who does not own an
interest in a passthrough entity uses separate property to pay a tax
deficiency, interest, or penalties attributable to the entity's
undistributed income, the spouse will have a claim for
reimbursement from the other spouse (or former spouse) for onehalf of the amount paid to the taxing authority or authorities.
Reimbursement may not be forthcoming, however, if the other
spouse or former spouse has no community property with which to
reimburse the spouse who paid the tax. The liability of a spouse
who owes reimbursement in a case where separate property has
been used to satisfy a community obligation is limited to the value
of the obligor-spouse's share23 in the community after deduction for
all community obligations.'
At first blush, it does not seem fair that a spouse who is not
entitled to receive one-half of the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity that constitutes the separate property of the
other spouse also is not entitled to receive reimbursement for onehalf of the community property used to pay the taxes on that
income when the community terminates. This inequitable result,
however, is not limited to the undistributed income from a
passthrough entity or the tax on that income where the interest in
the entity is the separate property of a spouse. In a case where a
spouse has reserved the fruits of separate property as separate
property, the other spouse still is jointly and severally liable for the
121. On termination of the community, a spouse is entitled to reimbursement
for one-half of the amount or value of community property used to satisfy the
other spouse's separate obligation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2364. A spouse also is
entitled to a reimbursement of one-half of the amount or value of separate
property used to satisfy a community obligation. LA. CrV. CODE art. 2365.
Nevertheless, the community is responsible for its own obligations. Thus, there
should be no reimbursement to either spouse for community property used to
satisfy community obligations.
122. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2365.
123. Id.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

tax on that income if the spouses file a joint return. Thus, for
example, if a spouse owns rental property as separate property and
reserves the rental income from that property as separate property,
the other spouse will not be entitled to one-half of the rental
income or one-half of the taxes paid on that rental income on
termination of the community if the spouses filed a joint income
tax return. Moreover, spouses who reside in non-community
property states are jointly and severally liable for the tax on the
spouses' aggregate income, regardless of which spouse's labor or
property generates that income, if they file a joint return. Unlike a
spouse in a community property state, a spouse in a noncommunity property state has no interest in the property of the
other spouse, regardless of whether that property was acquired
during the marriage.
On the other hand, inequities could result if a spouse were
entitled to receive one-half of the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity owned as separate property of the other spouse
on termination of the community. A member of a Louisiana LLC,
partnership, or S corporation does not own an interest in any of the
entity's undistributed property.' 24 The value of the spouse's
interest in an LLC, partnership, or S corporation is likely to be less
than the spouse's share of the entity's undistributed income. Even
if the spouse owns a sufficient interest in the entity to require the
entity to distribute one-half of the spouse's interest in the entity's
undistributed income, requiring such a distribution could
compromise the entity's business, to the detriment of other
members, partners, shareholders, or employees.
Some of the inequity to the spouse who does not own any
interest in a passthrough entity may be reduced if the value of the
interest in the entity has been increased by the uncompensated or
undercompensated labor of either or both of the spouses. On
termination of the community, a spouse is entitled to
reimbursement for one-half of the increase in value of separate
property of the other spouse where that increase is attributable to

124. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1329 (1994 & Supp. 2009) (LLC member);
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801 (defining the term "partnership" as a juridical person,
distinct from its partners); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:41 (powers of a
corporation, including the right to sue and be sued in its own name and in any
manner to acquire, hold, use, and alienate or encumber property of any kind,
subject to special provisions and limitations prescribed by law or the articles of
incorporation). See also Taylor v. Taylor, 772 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 2d Cir.
2000) (mineral leases negotiated by an LLC during the existence of the
community were not community property where the interest in the LLC was the
separate property of one of the spouses).
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the uncompensated or undercompensated labor or industry of
either or both of the spouses. 125
Nevertheless, entitlement to reimbursement for one-half of the
increase in value of an interest in a passthrough entity attributable
to uncompensated labor of either spouse may be of little value to
the spouse who does not own an interest in the entity. No
reimbursement is allowed to the extent that a spouse has been
fairly compensated of his or her labor.126 The spouse seeking
reimbursement must first prove that the increase in value of the
separate property was attributable to the labor
that one or both
27
spouses expended on the separate property. 1
If the increase in value of an interest in a passthrough entity is
attributable to the labor of an employee other than one of the
spouses, no reimbursement is due. r 2 Louisiana courts also have
held that compensation for labor provided on behalf of a
corporation includes not only the spouse's salary, but also amounts
distributed as dividends. 29 Similarly, compensation for a spouse's
130
labor should include distributions from a partnership or LLC.
Thus, to the extent that an entity has paid for a spouse's services or
distributed amounts commensurate with the value of the services
provided to the entity by the spouse, no reimbursement will be
required on termination of the community if the interest in the
entity is the separate property of the other spouse. Moreover, no
125. Louisiana Civil Code article 2368 provides, "If the separate property of
a spouse has increased in value as a result of the uncompensated labor or
industry of the spouses, the other spouse is entitled to be reimbursed from the
spouse whose property has increased in value one-half of the increase attributed
to the common labor." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2368. The phrase, "common labor"
implies that a spouse is not entitled to reimbursement unless the value of the
property has increased as a result of the labor of both spouses. The comment to
Louisiana Civil Code article 2368, however, clarifies that reimbursement is
permitted for one-half of the increase in value attributable to the uncompensated
common labor of either spouse. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2368 cmt. For cases
discussing the issue of whether an increase in the value of the separate property

of a spouse is attributable to the uncompensated or undercompensated labor of
one or both of the spouses, see KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO,
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 7.18, in 16 LOUISIANA CiviL LAW TREATISE 608-23
(3d ed. 2007).
126. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2368 cmt.
127. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 125, § 7.18, at610.
128. See, e.g., Brehm v. Brehm, 762 So. 2d 1259 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 772 So. 2d 657 (La. 2000); Phillips v. Wagner, 470 So. 2d 262 (La. App.
5th Cir.), writ denied, 474 So. 2d 948 (La. 1985).
129. See, e.g., Beals v. Fontenot, 111 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1940).
130. Cf Abraham v. Abraham, 87 So. 2d 735, 738 (La. 1956) (applying
similar principles in determining that the value of an interest in a partnership had
been increased by the wife's management of the partnership).
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reimbursement is available if the increase in the value of an
interest in an entity constituting the separate property of the other
spouse is attributable to factors other than the services provided by
a spouse, such as the vagaries of the economy or the type of
business in which the entity is engaged.131
If a spouse has proven that the value of separate property of the
other spouse has been increased in whole or in part as a result of
the uncompensated or undercompensated labor of one or both of the
spouses, however, the spouse is entitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the enhanced value attributable to that labor.1 32 The
Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a spouse seeking
reimbursement for one-half of the enhanced value of separate
property must prove: (1) the property is separate; (2) the property
increased in value; and (3) the increase in value was attributable to
the uncompensated or undercompensated labor of the other
spouse. 133 Once the spouse has satisfied that burden of proof, the
burden of proof shifts to the other spouse to prove that the increase
in value was due to factors other than the uncompensated or
undercompensated labor.' 34 While the spouse seeking reimbursement
does not have to prove a negative, i.e., that the value of separate
property was not due to the ordinary course of things, the initial
burden may nevertheless be high, especially if the spouse whose
interest in the entity constitutes separate property either has not
provided services on behalf of the entity or has received sufficient
compensation for services provided to the entity.
B. JointReturn, Payment of the Tax with SeparateProperty
Another problem may arise, however, if the tax liability on the
joint return is paid with the separate property of the spouse who
owns the interest in the passthrough entity. As explained earlier,
the tax required to be paid in connection with a joint return of a
couple living under a community property regime is a community
obligation. If separate property is used to satisfy a community
131. See, e.g., Gill v. Gill, 895 So. 2d 807, 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005)
(husband who worked on wife's separate property not entitled to reimbursement
of one-half of the increase in value of the property due to the general
appreciation in the real estate market); Guarisco v. Guarisco, 526 So. 2d 1126,
1131 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 1337 (La. 1988) (wife denied
reimbursement for increase in value of stock owned as separate property
primarily attributable to the vagaries of the oil industry during the period in
question).
132. SPAHT & MORENO,supra note 125, § 7.18, at 619.
133. Salley v. Salley, 661 So. 2d 437, 438-39 (La. 1995).
134. Id.
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obligation, the spouse whose property was so used is entitled to
reimbursement of one-half of the value of the amount or value of
the property on termination of the community. 135 Thus, if a spouse
whose interest in a passthrough entity is separate property uses
separate property to pay the tax on the spouse's share of the
entity's undistributed income, and the couple files a joint income
tax return, the spouse who paid the tax will be entitled to one-half
of the tax payment on termination of the community.
While it may seem unlikely that a spouse would pay the tax
reported on a joint return with separate property, questions may
arise if a passthrough entity pays the tax on its undistributed
income. Partnerships and S corporations that do not make frequent
distributions often pay income tax on behalf of the partners and
shareholders. If the passthrough entity actually distributes the
amount of tax due on a spouse's share of the entity's income, the
distribution will be community property. As explained earlier,
Louisiana courts have consistently held that distributions from a
partnership or S corporation are community property even if the
interest in the entity is the separate property of one of the spouses
unless the spouse-partner or spouse-shareholder has reserved
income from the passthrough entity as his or her separate property.
Sometimes, however, an LLC, partnership, or S corporation
will pay the tax liability of its members, partners, or shareholders
directly to the taxing authorities. 3 6 If such a payment is made on
behalf of a spouse whose interest in the entity is separate property,
there may be a question as to whether the tax payment constitutes
community property or separate property. For income tax
purposes, the payment will be treated as a constructive distribution.
If community property law adopts the federal tax treatment of the
tax payment as a constructive distribution, then the payment is
community property. As explained earlier, actual distributions of
the income of an LLC, partnership, or S corporation constitute
135. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2365 (2009).
136. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(1)(2)(ii) (2008) (concerning the issue of
whether tax withheld by an S corporation and paid to a state on behalf of its
shareholders will result in the S corporation having more than one class of stock
and thereby terminating the corporation's subchapter S election). See also LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:201.1 (2001 & Supp. 2009) (requiring partnerships to
withhold and pay Louisiana income tax on behalf of nonresident partners unless
the partners agree to submit to the state's jurisdiction to collect the tax directly
from the partners); id. § 47:287.732 (requiring an S corporation to pay income
tax on its own income unless each of the shareholders includes on his or her
income tax return the shareholder's pro rata share of the S corporation's
income). Cf, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929)
(corporation paid taxes owed by some of its officers directly to the Treasury
Department).
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community property even if the interest in the distributing entity is
the separate property of one of the spouses. Because the tax
liability is a community obligation when a joint return is filed, the
spouse whose interest in the entity is separate property will not be
entitled to reimbursement of any portion of the tax payment if the
constructive distribution used to pay the tax is community
property. A payment of a community obligation with community
property does not give rise to a claim for reimbursement by either
spouse.
On the other hand, if Louisiana courts do not treat the tax
payment as a constructive distribution from the entity, then the
amount of the tax payment is separate property. As explained
earlier, Louisiana courts have held that the undistributed income of
a partnership or S corporation (and presumably, of an LLC taxed
as a partnership or S corporation) is not community property where
the interest in the entity is the separate property of a spouse. If the
tax payment is treated as having been paid with the entity's
undistributed income, the payment should be treated as having
been made with separate property. When separate property is used
to pay a community obligation, the spouse whose separate property
is so used is entitled to reimbursement on termination of the
community of one-half of the amount or value of the property used
to pay the obligation.' 37 It is not certain whether Louisiana courts
will treat the payment of the tax by an LLC, partnership, or S
corporation on its undistributed income as a distribution for
purposes of community property law.
Federal courts have defined the term "constructive
distribution" as a specific economic benefit provided by a
corporation to a shareholder for which the shareholder does not
pay the equivalent value.' 38 For example, if a corporation pays an
obligation of a shareholder without any reimbursement by the
shareholder to the corporation, the payment is a constructive
distribution to the shareholder.' 39 When a corporation sells
property to a shareholder at a discount, the discount may be treated
as a constructive distribution. For example, if a corporation sells an
item to a shareholder for $60, but the item is worth $100, the

137. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2365.
138. See United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1969) (defming
the term "constructive dividend" as an economic benefit provided by the
corporation to the shareholder "without expectation of repayment").
139. See BORiS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

2000 & 2008 Supp.).

§ 8.05[8] n.222 (7th ed.
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from the
shareholder is treated as receiving a distribution
40
corporation of $40, the amount of the discount.
A transfer from a corporation to a relative of a shareholder may
be treated as a constructive distribution to the shareholder followed
by a gift from the shareholder to the relative. 4 1 Courts also have

treated as constructive distributions money or property transferred
by a corporation to a person other than the shareholder if the
payment provides an economic benefit for the shareholder. For
example, the transfer of money from one corporation to another
corporation for no consideration has been treated (for tax purposes)
as a distribution from the corporation to the shareholder in cases
where the shareholder
owned a controlling interest in both
42
corporations. 1
For purposes of federal income tax law, an entity other than a
corporation also may make constructive distributions to its owners.
In the case of passthrough entities like partnerships and S
corporations, however, the classification of the entity's income as a
constructive distribution often does not make a difference in the
tax results to the owner. Unlike the income of a C corporation, the
income of a passthrough entity is included in the owners' income
when the entity earns the income and then is tax-free, regardless of
whether that income is actually or constructively distributed to the
owner. 143

140. See Treas. Reg. § 1.301-10) (property transferred by a corporation to a
non-corporate shareholder is treated as a distribution in an amount equal to the
difference between the amount paid for the property and its fair market value). If
the discount is granted to a shareholder who also is an employee of the
corporation, the amount of the discount may be treated as salary. I.R.C. § 83(a).
141. See, e.g., Hagaman v. Comm'r, 958 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1992); Green v.
United States, 460 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1972); Epstein v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 459
(1970).
142. See, e.g., P.R. Farms, Inc. v. Comm'r, 820 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1987);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 548 (1986).
143. The treatment of a payment by a partnership or S corporation to another
person as a constructive distribution to a partner or shareholder, however, does
have an impact under federal tax law. A constructive distribution from a
partnership on behalf of a partner will reduce the partner's capital account and
may reduce the adjusted basis of the partner's interest in the partnership (but not
below zero). I.R.C. §§ 705(a)(2), 733 (2002) (adjusted basis of a partner's
interest in a partnership reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of money
and the adjusted basis of property distributed to the partner); Treas. Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (capital account reduced by the amount of money and the
fair market value of property distributed to the partner). To the extent that a
constructive distribution of money to a partner exceeds the adjusted basis of the
partner's interest in the partnership, the partner will recognize gain. I.R.C. §
731(a)(1). A constructive distribution from an S corporation to a shareholder
will reduce (but not below zero) the accumulated adjustments account (if the S
corporation has an AAA) and the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock.
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A transfer from a corporation does not need to be treated as a
distribution under state law to be treated as such for federal income
tax purposes. 144 Thus, a transfer treated as a constructive
distribution under federal income tax law will not necessarily be
treated as such under state law. The Louisiana Civil Code does not
necessarily treat all corporate distributions as "fruits" to be treated
as community property. Article 551 of the Civil Code defines the
term "fruits" as things produced by or derived from another thing
without diminution of its substance. 145 Article 551 provides, in
part, "Civil fruits are revenues derived from a thing by operation of
law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals, interest, and
certain corporate distributions. 1 46 The word "certain" indicates
that not all corporate distributions are fruits of the corporation's
stock. Article 551 and the comments thereto do not specify what
types of corporate distributions constitute fruits.
For purposes of community property law, however, Louisiana
courts sometimes have declined to treat as distributions transfers
from corporations that are constructive distributions under federal
147
income tax law. For example, in McClanahan v. McClanahan,
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that transfers from
one entity owned by Mr. McClanahan to another entity owned by
Mr. McClanahan did not constitute community property where
both entities were his separate property. Under federal income tax
law, some of the transfers in McClanahan could have been treated
as constructive distributions to Mr. McClanahan, followed by a
contribution by Mr. McClanahan to the other entities.
Mr. and Mrs. McClanahan were married on January 23, 1988,
and lived under a community property regime until the community
terminated on March 25, 1998. During their marriage, Mr.
McClanahan engaged in numerous complicated business

I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (adjusted basis of an S corporation
shareholder's stock reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of distributions
from the corporation that were not includible in the shareholder's income under
Code section 1368); id. § 1368(e)(1)(A) (adjustments to an S corporation's
accumulated adjustments account generally made in the same manner as the
adjustments to the basis of the shareholders' stock under Code section 1367).
144. See, e.g., Jacques v. Comm'r, 935 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1991) (possible
prohibition of a dividend by state law did not preclude finding of a constructive
dividend); Estate of Chism v. Comm'r, 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963)
(adjudication by state court not controlling).
145. LA. CiV. CODE art. 551 (2009).
146. Id.(emphasis added).
147. 868 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004).
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transactions, many of which were the subject of Mrs. McClanahan's
claims for distributions on termination of the community.
Mr. McClanahan conducted business through several affiliated
LLCs, partnerships, and corporations, some of which existed
before he married Mrs. McClanahan, and some of which came into
existence during their marriage. Mrs. McClanahan sought a
distribution on termination of the community of some of the assets
resulting from business transactions between and among the
entities.
One of the entities was McClanahan Contractors, a corporation
formed before the existence of the community. Mr. McClanahan
owned 85% of the stock in McClanahan Contractors. McClanahan
Contractors acquired a 50% interest in Sterling Investments, LLC
in exchange for $50,000 at a time when Mr. and Mrs. McClanahan
were married. Mr. McClanahan testified that the $50,000 capital
contribution came from funds received on the sale of other separate
property owned by McClanahan Contractors. The remaining 50%
interest in Sterling Investments was owned by Kelly O'Rourke,
Mr. McClanahan's daughter. Sterling Investments obtained a bank
loan for $169,000, which was personally guaranteed by Mr.
McClanahan and Ms. O'Rourke. On May 15, 1996, Sterling
Investments purchased for $211,000 a piece of residential real
estate in which Ms. O'Rourke intended to reside. In September of
1997, Ms. O'Rourke assigned an oil and gas lease to Sterling
Investments, valued at $25,000, as a capital contribution. Later,
Sterling Investments borrowed money from another one of Mr.
McClanahan's corporations and obtained a bank loan. In 1999,
McClanahan Contractors contributed another $4,000 to the capital
of Sterling Investments, and Sterling Investments purchased
another piece of residential property for $465,000.
Mr. McClanahan testified that the purpose of Sterling
Investments was to help his daughter purchase a house. Because
the property was owned by the LLC, and not Ms. O'Rourke, she
would not have title to the property unless she paid for it. A federal
court could have held that McClanahan Contractors' $50,000
contribution to the capital of Sterling investments was a
constructive distribution to Mr. McClanahan, followed by a
transfer of that amount to Sterling Investments or a gift to his
daughter, Ms. O'Rourke. In 1996, the only property held by
Sterling Investments was a piece of residential property acquired
for the benefit of Ms. O'Rourke. There did not seem to be any
benefit to McClanahan Contractors in acquiring an interest in an
LLC formed to acquire residential property for the daughter of its
majority shareholder. While McClanahan Contractors actually held
a 50% interest in Sterling Investments, it seems that the only
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purpose for which Sterling Investments was formed in 1995 was to
benefit Ms. O'Rourke. The facts do not indicate that Ms. O'Rourke
would pay a commission or premium to the LLC for acquiring the
property on her behalf.
Sometime after Sterling Investments was formed, Ms.
O'Rourke drew $29,700 from the LLC and made some repairs on
the property valued at $93,000. There is no indication, however of
the amount that Ms. O'Rourke paid for the repairs. If she paid
$93,000 for the repairs, the $63,300 net amount ($93,000 $29,700 draw) could have been treated as a contribution to the
capital of Sterling Investments. The contribution, however, would
not have benefitted McClanahan Contractors unless Ms. O'Rourke
was required to pay Sterling Investments the fair market value of
the residential property she intended to use as her personal
residence. There is no indication that she would be required to pay
Sterling Investments any more than the $211,000 Sterling
Investments had paid to acquire the property. If the foregoing
interpretation of the facts in McClanahan is correct, then the
$50,000 capital contribution to Sterling Investments by
McClanahan Contractors served no business or investment purpose
or opportunity for the corporation. In that case, the contribution
could have been treated as a constructive distribution to Mr.
McClanahan. Federal courts have held that payments by a
corporation for the benefit of a shareholder's child constituted
constructive distributions to the shareholder. 148
It is likely that the $4,000 McClanahan Contractors contributed
to Sterling Investments in 1999 would not have been treated as a
constructive distribution to Mr. McClanahan because that amount
was used to acquire a second residential property by the LLC. If
the LLC had acquired the second property as an investment or to
hold for rent, McClanahan Contractors, as a 50% member of the
LLC, would have benefitted from its $4,000 contribution. On the
other hand, if Sterling Investments had purchased the second
residential property for the benefit of Mr. McClanahan or one of
his relatives, then that contribution also could have been treated as
a constructive distribution to Mr. McClanahan. The 1999
contribution, however, should not have been an issue in
McClanahan because it was made after the termination of the
community in 1998.
In McClanahan,the fifth circuit declined to treat the $50,000
capital contribution by McClanahan Contractors to Sterling
148. Cf Nicholls N. Buse Co. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1225 (1971) (dominant
shareholder received constructive distribution from personal use of a corporate
yacht by the shareholder's son).
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Investments as a distribution to Mr. McClanahan under community
property law. Mrs. McClanahan argued that because Sterling
Investments was created during the existence of the community,
the LLC was community property. The court held that Mr.
McClanahan had no direct interest in Sterling Investments. The
interests in the LLC were owned, 50% by McClanahan
Contractors, a separate and distinct entity, and 50% by Ms.
O'Rourke. The court noted:
Ms. McClanahan has not argued, nor would it be supported
by the record, grounds to pierce the corporate veil and we
find no reason to do so. Further, no intent on the part of Mr.
McClanahan to reduce the community interest has been
shown. Mr. McClanahan testified that he was trying to
assist his daughter's acquisition of a $211,000 house, a
thing that a father with a 50 million dollar separate estate
has the right to do. Thus, respecting the legal status of
McClanahan Contractors as a separate and distinct legal
entity, and the fact that it is not disputed that McClanahan
Contractors is the separate property of Mr. McClanahan,
the asset [i.e., McClanahan Contractors' interest
149 in Sterling
Investments] cannot be community property.
The McClanahan court effectively treated the transfer of
$54,000 by McClanahan Contractors to Sterling Investments as a
conversion of separate property to another asset constituting
separate property. Louisiana courts generally treat a capital
contribution of separate property to an entity as a mere change in
the form, so that the interest in 50
the entity constitutes separate
property of the transferring spouse.1
149. McClanahan, 868 So. 2d at 850.
150. See, e.g., Moise v. Moise, 956 So. 2d 9 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2007) (when
spouse transferred separate property to an LLC in exchange for a 100% interest
in the LLC, the LLC was the separate property of the transferring spouse);
Reeves v. Reeves, 607 So. 2d 626, 629-30 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 608
So. 2d 1010 (La. 1992) (one-half interest in real estate acquired during the
existence of the community constituted separate property of the husband where
husband transferred his interest in other real estate valued at $38,340, plus
$21,667 (of which only $7,030 was community property); held, entire one-half
interest in the real estate constituted separate property because the value of
community property transferred in the exchange was inconsequential in relation
to the value of separate property transferred in the exchange); Succession of
Sonnier, 208 So. 2d 562, 566 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (real estate received by a
spouse in exchange for real estate owned by that spouse as separate property
constituted the separate property of the transferring spouse). See also LA. Civ.
CODE art. 2341 (2009) (separate property includes property acquired by a spouse
with separate things or with separate and community things when the value of
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In McKneely v. McKneely, 151 the Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal also declined to treat a withdrawal from an S
corporation as a distribution under community property law to the
spouse whose stock in the corporation constituted his separate
property. In McKneely, Mr. McKneely had withdrawn an
aggregate amount of $110,000 from the S corporation's savings
and checking accounts. Mr. McKneely effected the $110,000
withdrawal by drafting three checks. First, Mr. McKneely
withdrew $50,000 from the S corporation's savings account and
purchased a cashier's check payable to the S corporation. He
drafted a second check from the S corporation's business checking
account and endorsed it to a bank in exchange for a cashier's check
payable to the order of himself. Both cashier's checks were held in
the safe of Mr. McKneely's accountant. The third check, for
$10,000, was drafted from the S corporation's business checking
account. Mr. McKneely cashed the $10,000 check. He later
returned the entire $110,000 to the S corporation.
The trial court found that all three checks were written as a
protective measure for Mr. McKneely's benefit during a period of
dispute between Mr. McKneely and his brother, each of whom
owned one-half of the S corporation's stock. By drafting the
checks and purchasing cashier's checks, Mr. McKneely kept the
amounts drawn from the S corporation's savings and checking
accounts under his own control and out of the hands of his brother.
The trial court held that the entire $110,000 did not become
community property and therefore, Mrs. McKneely was not
entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the $110,000 on
termination of the community.
Reversing in part, the first circuit held that the $50,000 check
drawn to the order of Mr. McKneely was community property
because the funds were physically withdrawn from the account of
the S corporation and placed in Mr. McKneely's separate personal
account before the termination of the community. Mr. McKneely
had cashed both $50,000 checks by endorsing and exchanging
them for cashier's checks. The $10,000 check, however, was
drafted and cashed after the termination of the community. Thus,
the court held that the $10,000 check was not community property.
Even though the $50,000 cashier's check drafted to the order of the
S corporation was issued before the termination of the community,
the McKneely court held that the second $50,000 check was not

community things is inconsequential in comparison with the value of the
separate things used).
151. 764 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
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community property 1 52because it was not distributed to Mr.

McKneely personally.
Mr. McKneely had exercised control over the $50,000
cashier's check drafted to the order of the S corporation by having
the check placed in the accountant's safe to keep $50,000 of the
corporation's income from his brother. It is likely that a federal
court would have treated the check as a constructive distribution.
Nevertheless, the court held that the $50,000 withdrawal was not
community income because the cashier's check was not drafted to
the order of Mr. McKneely.
Under McKneely, a check from an account of an S corporation
must be drawn to the order of the shareholder in order to be treated
as a distribution to the shareholder. The McKneely court
determined that its conclusion was not inconsistent with the third
circuit's conclusion in Guilott. Unlike the partnership in Guilott,
which had placed its undistributed income into the partners'
drawing accounts, the S corporation in McKneely had placed its
undistributed income into the corporation's accumulated
adjustments account over which the corporation had control until
that income was distributed to the shareholder. The court noted
that unlike a partner's drawing account, an S corporation's
accumulated adjustments account is not a physically separate
account for the benefit of one of the owners, but instead is an
"accounting established on paper for bookkeeping purposes."' 53
Accordingly, the court concluded that an S corporation
shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's undistributed
income reflected in the accumulated adjustments account differs so
significantly from a partner's drawing account that amounts
reflected in the AAA are not community property.
Just as the McKneely court disregarded the characterization of
the retained earnings of an S corporation under federal income tax
law, the McKneely court also declined to treat a payment from an S
corporation to a person other than a shareholder as a constructive
distribution from the S corporation even if that payment might
have constituted a constructive distribution under federal income
tax law. As explained earlier, a constructive dividend under federal
tax law generally is an economic benefit conferred on a
shareholder by a corporation if the shareholder does not pay fair
consideration in exchange for the benefit. Thus, the payment by a
passthrough entity of tax on behalf of an owner is a constructive
dividend to the owner for federal tax purposes.

152. Id.at 1160.
153. Id.
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McClanahan and McKneely, however, indicate that the
payment of income tax by a passthrough entity on its own income
will not be treated as a constructive distribution and should
therefore constitute a payment of the tax with separate property if
the interest in the entity is separate property. In that case, on
termination of the community, the spouse who does not own the
interest in the entity may be required to reimburse the spouse who
owns the interest in the entity one-half of the tax paid by the entity
on the income reported on the spouses' joint tax return.
As explained earlier, the liability for tax on separate income is
a community obligation if the spouses file a joint return. On
termination of the community, a spouse who uses separate property
to satisfy a community obligation is entitled to reimbursement of
one-half of the amount or value of the community property used to
satisfy the obligation.1 54 If undistributed income of a passthrough
entity is separate property and is used to pay the tax with respect to
a joint income tax return, then the Louisiana community property
law may require the non-owning spouse to reimburse the other
spouse in an amount equal to one-half of the tax paid by the entity.
It is hoped that a Louisiana court will find a way to avoid requiring
reimbursement of any of the tax in such a case.
C. Separate Income Tax Returns
No cases could be found in which a court determined whether
the liability for the tax on one-half of the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity is a community obligation if the spouses file
separate income tax returns. If a spouse who files a separate
income tax return is not liable for tax on the undistributed income
of a passthrough entity under federal tax law, the spouse is also
exempt from liability for state tax on that income. An individual
who is a Louisiana resident must include in his or her Louisiana
income the individual's federal adjusted gross income.' 55 An
individual's federal adjusted gross income includes the
individual's pro rata share of the gross income earned by a
154. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2365.
155. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:290(A) (2001) (individual income tax law
intended to comport with the United States Internal Revenue Code, except as
otherwise expressly provided); id. § 47:293(1) (2001 & Supp. 2009) (defining
the term "adjusted gross income" to mean the adjusted gross income that is
reportable on the individual's federal income tax return); id. § 47:293(9)(a)
(defining the term "tax table income" for Louisiana residents as adjusted gross
income increased by certain amounts and reduced by other amounts that are not
relevant to the discussion in this report); id. § 47:295(C) (imposing the
Louisiana individual income tax on an individual's Louisiana tax table income).
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partnership, S corporation, or LLC that is taxed as a disregarded
entity, partnership, or S corporation regardless of whether that
income is distributed to him or her.' 56 If the undistributed income
of a passthrough entity is treated as community property for federal
tax purposes, the spouse who does not own an interest in the entity
is required to include one-half of that income in his or her federal
adjusted gross income. For convenience, this Article will discuss
only the federal income tax precedent concerning the liability of a
spouse for the tax on one-half of the income earned by the other
spouse during and after the existence of the community, with the
reader's understanding that the Louisiana income tax treatment of
that income is the same as the manner in which the income is
treated for federal tax purposes.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a spouse who is
a domiciliary of a community property state is personally liable for
the tax on one-half of the community income even if the spouses
file separate income tax returns.157" Similarly, Louisiana courts
have held that liability for tax on income earned by one of the
spouses during the existence of the community is a community
obligation. 158 In all of the Louisiana cases treating the tax on one
of the spouse's income as a community obligation, the income on
which the tax was due was community income. In contrast, federal
courts sometimes have held that a spouse in a community property
state is liable for tax on one-half of the other spouse's separate
income.
The Supreme Court's primary rationale for requiring a nonearning spouse in a community property state to pay tax on onehalf of the income earned by the other spouse is that the nonearning spouse has a present, vested, one-half ownership interest in
that income under community property law.159 As soon as
community income is earned, one-half of the income belongs to
the non-earning spouse. It would seem that a spouse who files a
separate income tax return should not be liable for tax on one-half
of the undistributed income of a passthrough entity if that income
is not community property. Nevertheless, in United States v.

156. I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 62(a)(1), 702(a), 1366(a) (2002 & Supp. 2008); Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2008).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971); Poe v.
Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
158. See, e.g., Messersmith v. Messersmith, 86 So. 2d 169 (La. 1956);
Maginnis v. Maginnis, 580 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 588 So.
2d 111 (La. 1991); Franz v. Franz, 729 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999);
Freeman v. Freeman, 552 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
159. See, e.g., Poe, 282 U.S. 101.
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Mitchell,160 the United States Supreme Court held that a spouse
domiciled in Louisiana was liable for the tax on one-half of her
husband's income even though she was not entitled to and did not
have an ownership interest in any of the income under Louisiana
community property law.
In Mitchell, Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell were married and living
under a community property regime in Louisiana. During their
marriage, Mr. Mitchell was in charge of the couple's financial
affairs and seldom consulted Mrs. Mitchell about them. She had so
little knowledge of her husband's finances that she often did not
know the balance in the family bank account. Even though Mr.
Mitchell assured Mrs. Mitchell that he had filed their joint income
tax return every year, no income tax returns had been filed for
1955 through 1959.
The Mitchells began to live separately and apart in July 1960,
and they were divorced in October 1962. Mrs. Mitchell renounced
the community on September 18, 1961. Under Louisiana
community property law in effect at that time, a wife who
renounced the community was not entitled to any distribution of
community prooerty or a property settlement upon dissolution of
the marriage. 16 The effect of renunciation, however, was
' 62 to
exonerate the wife of "debts contracted during the marriage.'
When the IRS sought to collect the tax on one-half of the
income earned by Mr. Mitchell from 1955 through 1959, Mrs.
Mitchell argued that she was not personally liable for community
obligations because she had renounced the community. The tax
liability in question was a community obligation because it had
been incurred during the existence of the community on income
attributable to Mr. Mitchell's effort, skill, and industry during the
existence of the community.1 63 The United States Supreme Court
disregarded the exoneration of Mrs. Mitchell under Louisiana
community property law as to the liability to pay federal income
tax. Accordingly, Mrs. Mitchell was liable for tax on one-half of
the income Mr. Mitchell earned during the existence of the
community even though she had not received any of the
160. 403 U.S. 190.
161. Former Louisiana Civil Code article 2410 provided, "Both the wife and
her heirs or assigns have the privilege of being able to exonerate themselves
from the debts contracted during the marriage by renouncing the community of
acquets and gains." LA. CIrv. CODE art. 2410 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts
No. 709, § 1.
162. Id.
163. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338 (2009) (defining the term "community
property" to include property acquired during the existence of the legal regime
through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse).
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community property remaining after the divorce and did not have
an ownership interest in any of the community income Mr.
Mitchell earned while she was married to him.
Similarly, in Brent v. Commissioner,164 the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals disregarded Louisiana community
property law to hold a wife liable for the tax on one-half of the
income her husband earned between the date that she filed for
divorce and the date the divorce was final. Mrs. Brent had filed a
petition for divorce on March 26, 1970. The divorce became final
on December 9, 1971. Under Louisiana community property law, a
judgment for divorce terminates the community property regime
retroactively to the date that the petition was filed.' 5 Thus, if a
judgment of divorce is granted, the income of each spouse earned
after the petition for divorce was filed and during the pendency of
the suit is the separate property of the spouse who earned the
income. The Brent court held that Mrs. Brent was liable for the tax
on one-half of the income earned by Mr. Brent during the
pendency of the divorce in661970 even though that income was Mr.
Brent's separate property.'
164. 630 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1980).
165. LA. CIv. CODE art. 150 (1870), repealedby 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 9.
During the year in issue in Brent, former Louisiana Civil Code article 155 also
provided for retroactive termination of the community upon the date the divorce
was final. Id.
166. In dicta, the Brent court opined that Mrs. Brent might have been entitled
to relief under Internal Revenue Code section 1341 for the tax she paid on onehalf of the amount of income her husband earned after the termination of the
community. 630 F.2d at 359-60 n.8. Under the theory suggested by the Brent
court, section 1341 would allow the non-earning spouse to claim a credit against
tax for the year in which the divorce was final in an amount equal to the tax paid
on her husband's income earned after the retroactive termination of the
community. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5) (2002). Alternatively, section 1341 would allow
Mrs. Brent to deduct the amount of the tax she paid on that income in the year in
which the divorce was final if the deduction, rather than the tax credit, would
produce better tax results to Mrs. Brent. Id. § 1341(a)(4). Relief is available
under section 1341 if: (1) an item was included in income in a prior year
because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the item; (2) a
deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established after the
close of such prior year that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to the
item or to a portion of the item; and (3) the amount of the deduction exceeds
$3,000. Id. § 1341(a)(1)(3). No cases could be found in which a court allowed a
spouse to claim relief under section 1341 for tax paid on amounts of community
income on which the spouse paid tax in an earlier year. It is not certain that the
IRS would allow a spouse like Mrs. Brent to claim section 1341 relief for the tax
she paid on one-half of the income her husband earned after the petition for
divorce was filed and before the year in which the divorce was final. The IRS
has been reluctant to allow taxpayers to claim relief under section 1341 where
events happening in a year following the year in which the tax was paid
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Both Mitchell and Brent, however, can be distinguished from a
case in which the income in question is the separate property of
one of the spouses. In Mitchell and Brent, the income in question
was community property at the time it was earned. In contrast,
courts have held that the undistributed income of a passthrough
entity is not community income if one of the spouses owns an
interest in the entity as separate property. In determining whether a
spouse is liable for the tax on one-half of the undistributed income
of a passthrough entity, when the interest in the entity is the
separate property of the other spouse, a court should consider the
fact that the undistributed income was not community income at
the time it was earned. In Mitchell, the Supreme Court found it
significant that Mrs. Mitchell's power to renounce the community
was exercised long after her ownership in the community income
had been fixed under state law. 167 While Mrs. Mitchell had the
right to renounce the community income, that income was hers to
renounce or accept.
In Brent, the Fifth Circuit justified its imposition of the tax by
relying on the annual accounting principle of income tax law.
Under the annual accounting principle, a taxpayer must report
income using the facts that are available in which the income is
earned even though it might be determined that the taxpayer is
required to return that income in a later year. 168 At the time a
petition for divorce is filed in Louisiana, there is no certainty that
the divorce will be finalized. Couples may reconcile before the
case is decided or settled. If an action for divorce fails for any
reason, the community does not terminate. 169 The Fifth Circuit
provided the following rationale for imposing liability on Mrs.
Brent for the tax on income that was not hers:
There is no practical way for the tax collector to know that
a married person who files a tax return is party to a

establish that the taxpayer is not entitled to the item of income. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 68-153, 1968-1 C.B. 371.
167. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 204 (1971).
168. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
169. Indeed, the second sentence of Louisiana Civil Code article 159
provides, "The retroactive termination of the community shall be without
prejudice to rights of third parties validly acquired in the interim between the
filing of the petition and the recordation of the judgment." LA. Crv. CODE art.
159 (2009). Presumably, the government's claim for the tax liability incurred on
one-half of the community income is a right of a third party "validly acquired"
during the pendency of the suit for divorce. The second sentence of article 159
was not enacted until after 1970, the year in issue in Brent. Nevertheless, the
Brent court imposed liability for the tax on other grounds.
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separation or divorce proceeding. Even if that fact were
known, the levy of an assessment against the husband
would be improper if the suit were dismissed
170 or terminated
without a decree favorable to the plaintiff.
Mitchell and Brent could be treated as cases creating rules of
administrative convenience for purposes of determining whether a
spouse in a community property state is liable for the tax on onehalf of the other spouse's income even if that income is not
community property. In Mitchell, the court refused to treat
community income as separate property for a year in which it will
not be known whether the spouse who was otherwise liable for the
tax on one-half of the community would later renounce the
community. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit refused to impose upon the
tax collector the burden of determining whether a married spouse
was a party to a separation or divorce proceeding and whether the
divorce decree became final in a later year.
As explained earlier, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue of whether the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity is community property where the interest in the
entity is the separate property of one of the spouses. The Louisiana
Courts of Appeal have reached different conclusions in different
cases. It is not certain whether a federal court would impose on the
IRS the burden of analyzing different Louisiana appellate court
opinions to determine whether the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity the interest in separate property or community
property in a case where the interest in the entity is the separate
property of one of the spouses.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Mitchell to mean
that federal courts may disregard community property law to hold
a spouse liable for the tax on one-half of the other spouse's
income. In Bagur v. Commissioner,17 1 the Fifth Circuit disregarded
Louisiana community property law in holding two wives liable for
the tax on one-half of their husbands' income, even though the
wives had no access to the income and, in the case of Mrs. Bagur,
had no idea how much her husband had earned. The old head-andmaster laws under former Louisiana community property law were
in effect during the years in issue in Bagur. Under the theneffective community property law, the husband was the head and
72 As such, the
master
the partnership
community disposed
of gains.' of
husbandofadministered
the orcommunity,
its revenues

170. Brent, 630 F.2d at 360.
171. 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1979).
172. LA. Cwr. CODE art. 2404 (1870), repealedby 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1.
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produced by the community property, and was entitled to alienate
community property or the revenue therefrom without the consent
of the wife. 1 73 Under Louisiana community property law at the
time, the husband was responsible for community debts; the wife
was not personally liable for community obligations out of her
separate property. r _4 Indeed, a wife was not even a proper party
defendant in an action to collect a community obligation.
The tax liabilities in Bagur were community obligations,
incurred by the taxpayers' husbands in connection with
administering the community. The Fifth Circuit observed that if the
debts in Bagur were owed to a state creditor, rather than to the
United States, the taxpayers would have prevailed. 176 Nevertheless,
the Bagur court held the wives personally liable from their separate
property for the tax on one-half of their husbands' earnings citin
Mitchell as authority for disregarding community property law. '
Thus, it is not certain whether a federal court will follow
community property law in determining whether a spouse in a
community property state is liable for the tax on the separate
income of the other spouse.
As explained earlier, the Louisiana Civil Code provides that the
fruits of separate property are community property unless the
spouse reserves the fruits from that property as separate property in
writing. 178 The Louisiana appellate courts seem to agree that the
income of a passthrough entity is separate property if the interest in
the entity is separate property unless the share of the entity's
income is made available to a spouse who owns the interest in the
entity so that the spouse may withdraw the income at any time and
for any purpose. While the IRS should treat such income in
accordance with the decided cases, a federal court might hold that
it would impose too heavy a burden on the IRS to determine
whether, in fact, the undistributed income of such a passthrough
entity is separate property under Louisiana community property
law. During the existence of the community, the spouse who owns
an interest in a passthrough entity as separate property is required
to include the spouse's share of the entity's undistributed income
on that spouse's income tax return. As in Brent, a federal court
could decide that the IRS is not required to determine whether and
173. Id.
174. Bagur, 603 F.2d at 500 (citing Poindexter v. La. & Ark. Ry. Co., 128
So. 297 (La. 1930)); Smith v. Viser, 117 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960);
Rouchon v. Rocambra, 84 So. 2d 873 (La. App. Orl. 1956).
175. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2410, 2411 (repealed).
176. Bagur,603 F.2d at 500.
177. Id.
178. LA. Crv. CODE art. 2339 (2009).
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to what extent the undistributed income of a passthrough entity
allocated to a married taxpayer, who resides in a community
property state, is separate or community income, especially where
community property law provides that income from separate
property is community property.
Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not decided
whether the undistributed income of a passthrough entity is
community property if the interest in the entity is separate
property. Admittedly,79 the Louisiana Supreme Court held in
Reynolds v. Reynolds that the undistributed income of a trust is
not community property where the beneficiary held the interest in
the trust as separate property, but that the income distributed from
the trust was community property. Unlike the undistributed income
of a passthrough entity, however, the undistributed income of the
trust in Reynolds, like the undistributed income of a C corporation
was not includible in the beneficiary's income for tax purposes. 18
Under federal tax law, the current income of a trust, like the trust
in Reynolds, is generally included in 8the beneficiary's income
when it is distributed to that beneficiary.'
The treatment of the undistributed income in Reynolds was
consistent with federal income tax law. Thus, the IRS did not have
to determine whether the trust's undistributed income was
community or separate income. When the trust's income actually
was distributed to the beneficiary in Reynolds, the distributed
income constituted community property. Thus, each spouse was
personally liable for the tax on one-half of the income distributed
to the beneficiary. The treatment of the trust income in Reynolds
does not impose any administrative burden on the IRS. In contrast,
treating the undistributed income of a passthrough entity as
separate property for federal tax purposes would require the IRS to
utilize significant resources in determining whether the interest in a
passthrough entity is separate property, whether the spouse who
owns the interest in the entity had reserved the fruits as separate

179. 388 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1980).
180. The income in the trust in Reynolds could be accumulated or distributed
to the beneficiary at the discretion of the trustee. Such income, when not
distributed, is included in the income of the trust, and not the beneficiary. I.R.C.
§ 641(a)(4), (b) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
181. Like S corporations, trusts are treated as passthrough entities because
the income of a trust generally is subject to tax only once. A trust generally pays
tax on its own income. Id. § 641. However, the trust may deduct that income if it
makes certain distributions to the beneficiary. Id. §§ 651, 661. The beneficiary
then includes the distributed income on the beneficiary's income tax return for
the year in which the income is distributed to him or her. Id. §§ 652, 662.
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property, and whether and to what extent the entity's income had
been distributed to the spouse.
Furthermore, it is not certain whether a federal court will pay
strict attention to a decision of a state court for purposes of
determining whether a spouse in a community property state 18is
2
liable for the tax on the income of the other spouse. In Bagur,
the Fifth Circuit indicated that statutory law is more important than
case law in determining whether income earned by one spouse is
community or separate property. In Bagur, the court disregarded
the Louisiana Supreme Court's characterization of a wife's interest
in community property as "imperfect ownership" for purposes of
determining whether the taxpayer-wife had a sufficient ownership
interest in her husband's income to require her to8 use
her separate
3
property to pay the tax on one-half of his income.'
The United States Supreme Court's rationale for requiring a
spouse who files a separate return to pay tax on one-half of the
income earned by the other spouse during the existence of the
community is that the spouse has a present, vested income in that
community income.1 84 If a spouse's ownership in income earned
during the existence of the community is not a perfect ownership
interest, the spouse should not be liable for tax on one-half of that
income.
The taxpayers in Bagur argued that they should not be liable
for the tax on any income earned by their husbands during the
existence of the community because the Louisiana Supreme Court
recently had held that a wife's interest in community property was
an "imperfect interest. 1 85 Bagur was decided under the old headand-master provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, which allowed
the husband to control the disposition of community property
without the consent of the wife.' 6Because the wife lacked control
over the disposition of community assets, the Louisiana Supreme
Court concluded in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc.187 that the wife
lacked perfect ownership of community property.
182. 603 F.2d491.
183. Id.at 497-99.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 1763 (1971); Bender v.
Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
185. Bagur, 603 F.2d at 497 (relying on Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287
So. 2d 497 (La. 1973)), appeal after remand,276 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 299 So. 2d 802 (La. 1974).
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (1870), repealedby 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1
(as head and master of the community, husband is permitted to alienate
community property by onerous title or gratuitous title, without the consent of
the wife).
187. 287 So. 2d at 509.
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In Bender v. Pfaff,188 the United States Supreme Court had held
that a wife in Louisiana was liable for the tax on one-half of the
community income earned by her husband because the wife had a
present, vested one-half ownership interest in that income. In
reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on Phillips v.
Phillips, 89 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
wife owns one-half of the community property as soon as the
property is acquired and that the wife's interest in community
property is not that of an expectant heir.' 90
The taxpayers in Bagur argued that Creech, decided almost
fifty years after Phillips, had changed the Louisiana law with
respect to the wife's rights under Louisiana community property
law. While the Creech court held that the wife's interest in
community property was greater than a mere expectancy or a mere
right to inherit, the court nevertheless indicated that her interest
was somewhat less vested than the Phillips court had indicated. 19 1
In cases that did not concern the ownership of community
income, the United States Supreme Court consistently has held that
the person who earns income and has the power to dispose of that
192
income is the person who is liable for the tax on that income.

188. 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
189. 107 So. 2d 584 (1926).
190. Id. at 588.
191. Creech, 287 So. 2d at 508.
192. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (income from
property transferred to a trust is taxable to the transferor where the trust corpus
reverts back to the transferor on termination of the trust and the transferor
retains the power to determine whether and when the beneficiary will receive
distributions of that income, to vote the shares of stock transferred to the trust, to
dispose of trust income, to invest trust income, and to hold trust property in the
names of persons other than the income beneficiary of the trust, including in his
own name); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (compensation for personal
services included in the income of the person who performed the services);
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (income from property transferred to a
trust taxable to the transferor where the transferor retained the power to revoke
the trust and reacquire the trust corpus and income for himself). In Helvering,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to
those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the
benefit of it when paid .... The tax laid by the 1934 Revenue Act upon
income "derived from.., wages, or compensation for personal service,
of whatever kind and in whatever form paid... ; also from interest. .. "
therefore cannot fairly be interpreted as not applying to income derived
from interest or compensation when he who is entitled to receive it
makes use of his power to dispose of it in procuring satisfactions which
he would otherwise procure only by use of the money when received.

918

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Under those opinions, the wife's ownership of community income
in Louisiana should have been sufficiently imperfect to absolve her
of liability for tax on any of the community income earned by the
husband.
In holding that the taxpayers were personally liable for the tax,
the Bagur court disregarded the Creech opinion. In Bagur, the
Fifth Circuit indicated that statutory law was more significant than
case law in determining the nature of the wife's interest in
community property.
During the years in issue in Bagur, the Louisiana Civil Code
recited that a marriage in Louisiana "superinduces a partnership or
community" of gains. 193 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
wife's ownership interest was established because the Civil Code
provided that a husband and wife may dispose of his or her onehalf of the community by will and each was powerless to affect the
other's half.194 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit relied on the
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code concerning the wife's right
to one-half of the community assets upon the dissolution of the
community' 95 and the her liability for
96 her one-half share of the
debts contracted during the marriage. 1
The Louisiana Civil Code is silent as to whether the
undistributed income of a passthrough entity, the interest in which
is the separate property of one of the spouses, constitutes
community property where the spouse has not made a special
declaration that the fruits of separate property are separate
property. As explained earlier, the Louisiana Civil Code treats the
fruits of separate property (which may or may not include income
created by the efforts of one of the spouses) as community
property. Because the undistributed income of a passthrough entity
is subject to tax, a federal court could treat such income as "fruits"
and therefore community income, regardless of whether the
interest in the entity is community or separate property.
In United States v. Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court
seemed to have applied partnership income tax principles in
holding a spouse personally liable for tax on her share of the
community income. Former provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code

311 U.S. at 119 (1940). Subparts (1) and (4) to section 61(a) impose a tax
on the same income described in the quoted passage. I.R.C. § 61 (2002 &
Supp. 2008). Thus, Horst continues to serve as controlling precedent.
193. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2399 (1870), repealedby 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1.
194. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 915,916 (1870), repealedby 1981 La. Acts No. 919, § 1.
195. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2406 (1870), repealedby 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1.
196. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 (1870), repealedby 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1.
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referred to the community as a "partnership" or a "partnership of
gains.' ' 197 Even though the community was not considered a
commercial partnership at that time, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on the view that the wife was treated like a limited partner
under Louisiana community property law. 198 Similarly, a court
could hold that each spouse in a community property state is taxed
like a partner on all of the aggregate income of both spouses.
Like a wife under the old head-and-master provisions of
community property law, a limited partner may not participate in
the management of the business. 199 As explained earlier, a partner
is taxed on his or her share of partnership income when the income
is earned regardless of whether the income is distributed to the
partner. 20 Similarly, a federal court might apply federal tax law,
rather than community property law, in determining that each
spouse is personally liable for the tax on one-half the undistributed
income of a passthrough entity, regardless of whether the interest
in the entity is community or separate property.
however, the IRS ruled that the
In Revenue Ruling 73-391,
undistributed income of a partnership consisted in part of
community property and in part of separate property for purposes
of federal income taxation. In the revenue ruling, a husband and
wife residing in California became members of a partnership in
that state. The husband contributed both community and separate
property to the partnership in exchange for his partnership interest.
The wife contributed only community property to the partnership.
The husband received adequate compensation from the partnership
for services he provided to the partnership. The spouses had no
agreement in effect to change any of the community property they
had contributed to the partnership to separate property or to change
any of the separate property the husband had contributed to
community property.
Under California community property law in effect when
Revenue Ruling 73-391 was issued, community property consisted
197. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2399, 2402-2404, 2406, 2409-2410, 2415, 24182419, 2423, 2430 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1 (referring to
the community as a "partnership," a "partnership of gains," or a "community of
acquets or gains). The current provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code do not
refer to the community as a partnership.
198. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 201 (1971) (citing Succession
of Wiener, 14 So. 2d 475, 481-82 (La. 1943)).
199. A limited partner who participates in the control of the partnership's
business may be liable as a general partner for partnership debts and obligations.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2844(A) (2009).

200. I.R.C. § 702(a) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
201. 1973-2 C.B. 12.
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of property acquired by the husband and wife, when not acquired
as the separate property of either. 202 The IRS ruled that the
partnership profits attributable to the community property
contributed to the partnership, and amounts paid for the husband's
services constituted community property. Accordingly, the IRS
also ruled that the wife's distributive share of partnership income
consisted of one-half of the partnership income derived from the
community property she and her husband invested in the
partnership and one-half of the amount paid by the partnership for
her husband's services. The IRS also concluded that the husband's
distributive share of the partnership's income consisted of one-half
of the income attributable to the community property he and his
wife had invested in the partnership, one-half of the compensation
he received for his services to the partnership, and all of the
partnership income attributable to the separate property he had
contributed to the partnership.
Revenue Ruling 73-391 offers no guidance for taxpayers in
Louisiana. Unlike Louisiana community property law, it seems that
income from separate property was treated as separate property
under California law when the revenue ruling was issued. The IRS
did not have to determine whether the partnership income in
Revenue Ruling 73-391 had been distributed. If the partnership
income in Revenue Ruling 73-391 had been distributed, the portion
of the distribution still would have been separate property. In
contrast, the Louisiana courts have been consistent in holding that
distributions to a spouse from a partnership or corporation are
community property under Louisiana law, even if the interest in
the partnership or corporation is separate property.
Revenue Ruling 73-391, however, indicates that it might not be
too heavy a burden for the IRS to determine whether a passthrough
entity's income is separate or community property. In the revenue
ruling, the IRS carefully considered the facts and the law in
determining what portion of the partnership's income constituted
community property and what portion of that income constituted
separate property. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Civil Code is silent
as to the characterization of a passthrough entity's undistributed
income as separate or community property when an interest in the
entity is the separate property of one of the spouses, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not decided the issue. Moreover, no
cases could be found outside the Louisiana First and Third Circuit
Courts of Appeal in which appellate courts have decided the issue.
Thus, it is not certain whether the IRS or a court will follow the
202.

CAL. CrV. CODE § 687 (West 2007) (cited in Rev. Rul. 73-391, 1973-2

C.B. 12).
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first and third circuit's opinions in characterizing such income as
community or separate property.
D. Should FederalCourts Treat the UndistributedIncome of a
PassthroughEntity Owned as SeparatePropertyof a Spouse in
Louisianaas Community Propertyor SeparateProperty?
Because of the disparate treatment of the undistributed income
of a passthrough entity under Louisiana community property law
and federal income tax law, the IRS and the Louisiana Department
of Revenue have no real guidance for determining whether such an
entity's undistributed income should be treated as community
property for tax purposes. The Louisiana Supreme Court has not
decided the issue. On the termination of the community, a spouse
is entitled to receive one-half of the community property.203 Thus,
on termination of the community, the spouse who has no
ownership interest in the undistributed income of a passthrough
entity nevertheless may be liable for the tax on one-half of that
income under federal income tax law. If the tax liability on the
undistributed income of a passthrough entity is a community
obligation, the non-owning spouse will not be entitled to receive
any reimbursement for taxes paid with community property on that
income. When spouses who are domiciled in Louisiana file a joint
income tax return, the tax liability on the spouses' aggregate
income is a community obligation because each slouse's liability
for the tax is joint and several or joint and in solido. 04 If there is an
understatement or underpayment of the tax with respect to the joint
return, the IRS or the Louisiana Department of Revenue may seize
community property held by either spouse to satisfy the deficienc,
interest, or penalties incurred in connection with the joint return.
Thus, it is not necessary to determine the character of a
203. Upon the termination of the community, the spouses own community
property as co-owners. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.1 (2009). Nevertheless, either
spouse may request a partition of the community property at any time after the
community terminates. LA. CIV. CODE art. 807.
204. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360 (defining the term "community obligation" as
an obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of the community
property regime for the common interest of the spouses).
205. Cf Ordlock v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 47, 59-60 (2006), aff'd, 533 F.3d
1136 (9th Cir. 2008) (spouse domiciled in a community property state who
qualified for innocent spouse relief from joint and several liability for the tax in
connection with a joint return was not entitled to refund of tax authorized by the
statute because the tax on the community income was a community obligation
paid with community property; IRS should not be placed at a disadvantage
compared to any other creditor concerning community obligations).
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passthrough entity's undistributed income when the spouses file a
joint return.
The liability for the tax on a joint return applies both to
community income and to separate income, regardless of the
source of the income. Indeed, each spouse who is domiciled in a
non-community property state and files a joint return is jointly and
severally liable for the tax on the joint return, regardless of the fact
that the income may be entirely attributable to the other spouse.
Any inequity in imposing liability on a spouse for the tax
attributable to income of the other spouse is not caused by state
property law, but instead is the result of federal and state tax law.
The issue concerning the characterization of a passthrough
entity's income as community or separate property is relevant,
however, when the spouses file separate income tax returns. In
such cases, the disparate treatment of the income of and
distributions from partnerships and S corporations (and
presumably, LLCs taxed as partnerships, S corporations, or
disregarded entities) under community property law and federal
income tax law can create confusion and inequity.
The income tax liability of a taxpayer is generally determined
by reference to the state law property rights to that income. The
undistributed income of a passthrough entity is subject to tax when
it is earned. If the income was separate property when it was
earned, the same income will become community property when it
is distributed. Nevertheless, when the undistributed income of a
passthrough entity is distributed, the distribution is tax free. The
annual accounting principle would require federal courts to treat
the undistributed income of a passthrough entity as separate or
community property in accordance with the way the income is
classified under state community property law at the time the
income is earned.
Louisiana appellate courts have consistently held that the
undistributed income of a partnership or S corporation is generally
the separate property of the spouse who owns the interest in the
entity as separate property, except where that income has been
made available to the spouse so that he or she may withdraw it at
any time and for any purpose. The IRS should treat such income in
the same manner in which the appellate courts treat it unless and
until the Louisiana Supreme Court decides otherwise. The
Louisiana courts of appeal have treated a spouse's share of the
undistributed income of a partnership or S corporation consistently
with the statutory law. As explained earlier, such treatment seems
appropriate in determining whether the income of any passthrough
entity is separate or community property, except in cases where a
passthrough entity's undistributed income may be counted twice in
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determining the amount of community property to be distributed to
a spouse or the spouse's heirs on termination of the community.
The Louisiana Civil Code treats the natural and civil fruits of
separate property as community property unless the spouse who
owns the separate property reserves such fruits as separate property
in a written document and provides the document to the other
spouse before it is filed.20 6 For this purpose, article 551 of the
Louisiana Civil Code defines the term "civil fruits" as revenues
derived from a thing by operation of law or by reason of a juridical
act, such as rentals, interest, and certain corporate distributions.
Income that is earned, but not distributed, by a C corporation is not
a fruit of the corporate stock for purposes of community property
law. Because Louisiana partnerships and LLCs, like corporations,
are separate entities from their owners the undistributed income of
a Louisiana partnership, S corporation, or LLC generally should
not be treated as community property.
Moreover, the IRS and the Department of Revenue should be
familiar with the manner in which the third circuit has treated
income allocated to a partner's drawing account or made available
to the partner for withdrawal at any time. Treating such income as
constructively distributed to the partner is similar to the
constructive receipt doctrine under federal tax law. In general,
gains, profits, and income are included in a taxpayer's income in
the taxable year in which that income is actually or constructively
received by the taxpayer.20 7 Income is constructively received
when it is credited to the taxpayer's account, set apart for the
taxpayer, or otherwise made available so that the taxpayer may
draw on it at any time. 20 8 Likewise, the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal has held that a partner's share of partnership
income is treated as having been constructively distributed to the
partner and, therefore, constitutes community property where the
partner's interest in the partnership is separate property if the
partner may withdraw it at any time. The third circuit's rule should
also apply to undistributed income of an S corporation or LLC.
The IRS and the Louisiana Department of Revenue should not
have difficulty determining whether a passthrough entity's income
has been constructively distributed to the owner and therefore
constitutes community property.
Because the Louisiana Supreme Court has not decided whether
a spouse's share of the undistributed income of a passthrough
entity owned as separate property is community or separate
206. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2339 (2009).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (2008).
208. Id. § 1.451-2(a).
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property, there is no way to treat such income as either community
or separate property for tax purposes without creating inequity to
one of the spouses. On the one hand, it would be unfair to the
spouse who owned an interest in a passthrough entity as separate
property to treat the spouse's share of the undistributed income as
separate property for federal tax purposes even though the
Louisiana Supreme Court might decide later that the undistributed
income is community property. On the other hand, it also would be
unfair to the spouse who does not own an interest in the entity to
treat the entity's undistributed income as community property even
though the Louisiana Supreme Court might later hold that the
income is the separate property of the other spouse. Because one of
the spouses will lose, regardless of whether the Louisiana Supreme
Court treats the income as separate or community property, the
courts should follow the treatment of that income as decided by the
Louisiana appellate courts.
Of course, Congress could alleviate any potential problem, as
well as numerous other problems attributable to the manner in
which community income is taxed, by disregarding community
property law for purposes of determining the tax liability of each
of the spouses who are domiciled in a community property state. A
discussion of other problems that may arise because Congress
imposes liability on each spouse in a community property state for
the tax on one-half of the community income is beyond the scope
2 °9
of this Article. Those problems have been discussed elsewhere.
In the meantime, spouses in Louisiana will have to wait until
further guidance is offered concerning the treatment of the
undistributed income of a passthrough entity as community
property or separate property for both community property law
purposes and income tax purposes.
III. CONCLUSION

The Louisiana courts that have decided the issue have held that
the undistributed income of a passthrough entity owned as separate
property by a spouse domiciled in Louisiana is separate property
unless that income is made available to the spouse so that he or she
may withdraw it at any time and for any purpose. While the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the characterization
of such income as community or separate property, tax courts
209. See, e.g., Susan Kalinka, Federal Taxation of Community Income: A
Simpler and More EquitableApproach, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 633 (1990); John A.
Miller, Federal Income Taxation and Community Property Law: The Casefor
Divorce, 44 Sw. L.J. 1087 (1990).
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should treat that income in the same manner in which the appellate
courts treat the income. Treating a passthrough entity's income as
separate property, except in cases where the income has been set
aside for the spouse to withdraw at any time, would cause less
aggregate harm to the spouses and to the other owners of the
interests in, as well as the employees of, the passthrough entity on
termination of the community.
Of course, if the Louisiana Supreme Court decides that the
undistributed income of a passthrough entity owned as separate
property is separate property, the IRS and the Louisiana
Department of Revenue would follow the court's opinion.210 It is
hoped that the Louisiana Supreme Court will grant a writ to decide
the issue.
On the other hand, the Louisiana Legislature could amend the
Civil Code to provide that all income from separate property is
separate property. The IRS follows state property law in
determining whether a spouse in a community property state is
liable for the tax on income from property that constitutes the
separate property of the other spouse. 2 1 Of the nine community
property states, five treat income from separate property as
separate property. 2 12 The other four community property states,
including Louisiana, treat income from separate property as
community property. 213 Indeed, the Louisiana Legislature has
indicated that it does not have any policy reason for treating
income from separate property as community property. Article
2339 of the Louisiana Civil Code allows a spouse who owns
separate property to elect to treat the income from separate
property as separate property. 214 Nevertheless, commentators
disagree as to whether income from separate property should be
separate under community property law. 1 A discussion
210. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Gray, 159 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1947) (setting forth a
careful analysis of Louisiana Supreme Court cases to determine whether
royalties received on a mineral lease were community or separate income where
the mineral rights were the separate property of one of the spouses).
211. Rev. Rul. 73-391, 1973-2 C.B. 12.
212. See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (2007 & Supp. 2008); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 770 (West 2007) (repealed); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.130 (2007);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.16.010 (2005 & Supp. 2009).
213. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (2006 & Supp. 2008); LA. CIV. CODE art.
2339 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.001, 3.002 (Vernon 2006 & Supp.
2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
214. See also WIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.59.
215. See, e.g., Thomas R. Andrews, Income from Separate Property:
Towards a Theoretical Foundation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (1993)
(arguing that income from separate property should be treated as community
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concerning the propriety of treating income from separate property
as separate or community under state law is beyond the scope of
this Article.
The best solution to the problem, however, resides in the hands
of Congress. Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax
on the taxable income of individuals. The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted this language to mean that each spouse in a
community property state is liable for the tax on one-half of the
community income because each spouse has an undivided, present,
vested interest in one-half of that income. 2 16 While the Supreme
Court could change its mind, the Court has indicated that it has no
intention to do so.17
Congress could, however, amend section 1 of the Internal
Revenue Code to provide that in determining the income of an
individual, community property law shall not be taken into
account. Such a provision would not be unprecedented. The
Internal Revenue Code contains several provisions stating that the
statute applies without regard to community property law. 218 If
Congress amended section 1 to disregard community property law,
it would significantly reduce compliance costs and administrative
burdens incurred as taxpayers and the IRS determine the portion of
the aggregate income of a married couple that constitutes the
separate property of each of the spouses who are domiciled in a
community property state.

property);
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Harris,

"Just and Proper Division": Property

Distributionsat Divorce in Oregon, 78 OR. L. REV. 735, 761 (1999) (income
from 'separate property represents the investment decisions of the owner and
should be treated as separate property under marital property law); Margaret
Berger Strickland, Comment, What's Mine is Mine: Reserving the Fruits of
Separate Property Without Notice to the Unsuspecting Spouse, 51 LOY. L. REV
989, 1008 (2005) (indicating a preference for treating income from separate
property as community property).
216. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190(1971).
218. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1402(a)(5)(A)-(B), 6015(a) (2002 & Supp. 2008).

